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The development policy landscape has, in recent years, been dominated by four types of 
interventions: (1) infrastructure expansion and development; (2) the attraction of inward 
investment; (3) the promotion of innovation and development of human capital; (4) the 
cultivation of agglomeration and physical co-location. This paper engages with these four broad 
policy types with a view to, first, assess and comment on the utility of these approaches in 
different development contexts, and, second, provide an indication of what has worked and what 
has not worked in the design and implementation of these strategic actions. It relies on a review 
of a handful of ‘strategies of gain’ and ‘strategies of waste’ to ascertain insights into the steps 
that should be taken to maximise the likelihood that territorial development policies – 
irrespective of the development axis towards which they are oriented – fulfil their potential and 
contribute to the reduction of the territorial disparities in developed and developing contexts 
alike. The lessons drawn from this review are four-fold: i) development strategies composed of 
multiple related and mutually-reinforcing actions and interventions across development areas 
deliver better results; ii) strategic approaches to the promotion of economic growth that are 
solidly grounded in robust diagnoses are generally more successful; iii) the awareness of where 
exactly the territory is situated on the development spectrum is crucial; and iv) the institutional 
dimension cannot be left un-addressed in the design and implementation of policy interventions. 
These lessons are supplemented by a general framework relating to how territorial approaches to 
development should be designed for areas at different points in their development trajectories.  
 
Keywords: Development, development strategies, institutions, territorial inequality, lagging 
areas.   
 2 
1. Is there a need for territorial development policies in lagging cities and 
regions? 
 
 Economic growth tends not, for a number of generally well understood reasons, to 
transpire at the same rate and with the same intensity across space (World Bank, 2009). This 
tendency has produced gulfs between countries’ most economically prosperous core cities and 
regions and their lagging, less dynamic ones. As in the case of interpersonal inequality, territorial 
inequality tends to be more prevalent in less developed and emerging countries, than in 
developed ones. This is shown graphically in Figure 1, displaying country levels of regional 
inequality. Less developed and emerging countries (in red) exhibit, with few exceptions, much 
higher levels of inequality than more developed nations (in blue). 
 
Figure 1: Differences in territorial income inequalities among selected countries (Second Theil Index). Authors’ elaboration 
and calculation. Source: OECD and various national statistical offices; data for 2010 or the closest year available. 
 
There is, of course, an interpersonal element to territorial inequality. Individuals living in 
core areas, where opportunity (income-generating or otherwise), infrastructure and resources 
(broadly defined) are generally more abundant, tend to benefit from merely ‘being there’. The 
prospects of individuals living in lagging regions are, on the other hand, more limited. Some will 
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emigrate to more economically prosperous regions, fuelling a brain drain that is associated with 
economic consequences of its own. The livelihoods and wellbeing, however, of those that opt 
not, or are unable to do so can be adversely impacted by the lack of dynamism and opportunity 
in the territories where they live. 
 Territorial imbalances are associated with their fair share of ills and implications. One, in 
particular, has come to the fore of late: sufficiently pronounced and temporally sustained 
territorial inequalities sow the sort of social discontent, tensions and political unrest that can, and 
has in fact fuelled the rise of populism and the success of populist movements, leaders and 
parties.  
 
 Populism has long thrived in areas particularly affected by poverty, pronounced 
economic crises and persistent social problems (Roberts, 1995). Territorial inequality introduces 
another variable into this equation. As the gaps between ‘have’ and ‘have not’ territories, 
between areas rife with opportunities and those affected by prolonged economic decline, widen, 
the immediacy and tangibility of the social and economic challenges by which lagging  and 
declining regions are faced increases for those in them. This, in turn, fosters a sense of neglect 
and disenfranchisement. 
 
 Developing countries, given the pervasiveness of territorial inequalities are most 
susceptible to ‘inequality-induced populism’. That said, even the most economically advanced 
environments are not immune to it. Now US President, Donald Trump, the successful Brexit 
movement in the UK, France’s Marie Le Pen and her nationalist Front National and Germany’s 
far-right AfD party, among others, have drawn support not necessarily from individuals living in 
economically prosperous, core cities and regions – where the poorest of the poor have often in 
recent times voted in line with the economic elites –, but from increasingly frustrated voters in 
territories that have struggled to cope with the pressures associated with globalisation, 
technological change and more general economic progress. This populism, much like the 
proliferation of inequalities that breed it, is not without economic consequence; the social and 
political uncertainty and instability it gives rise to can, among other things, stifle public and 
private investment, limit personal mobility and migration and hamper trade and economic 
integration, with obvious consequences for productivity, employment outcomes, dynamism and, 
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ultimately, growth, both in less prosperous and declining areas and in the very core areas that 
have often acted as the motors of the economy. 
 
All of this begs the question of whether policies are needed to promote growth and 
development in underperforming, lagging areas. The answer, on the basis of the above, would 
seem to be yes. But, and this is the key caveat, the unidimensional, spatially-blind and often top-
down policies of the past will not be sufficient to affect change in lagging or falling-behind 
regions and reduce the gulf between economically core areas and their peripheral counterparts. 
Policies going forward will need to be strongly rooted in theory and in evidence. They will also, 
however, have to be sensitive to conditions in and the uniqueness of different territories and 
should focus explicitly on tapping and realising local potential. Such policies will need to make 
sure that institutional factors and elements are not overlooked in the planning and 
operationalisation of strategic approaches to development and, where necessary, that steps are 
taken to tackle institutional inefficiencies and bottlenecks head-on and within the context of the 
broader strategy.  
 
Policies and strategies that do so can be more efficient than those pursued in the past. 
That they will be is, however, far from a certainty; the risk that a particular territorial 
development intervention evolves into a ‘strategy of waste’ will always remain. It is this risk 
upon which the remainder of the paper is focused. More specifically, the following analysis 
weighs ‘strategies of waste’ against ‘strategies of gain’ to identify and understand they key 
differences between them with a view to ascertain insights into the steps policy-makers can take 
to maximise the likelihood that territorial development policies fulfil their potential and 
contribute to the reduction of the territorial disparities in developed and developing contexts 
alike.  
 
The preceding paragraphs reflect the implicit assumption or proposition upon which the 
paper is founded: that policy-makers must be attuned to the pervasiveness and immediacy of, and 
the consequences associated with territorial inequality and, moreover, that territorial 
intervention should be geared towards the promotion of growth and dynamism in all areas, 
lagging ones included. The paper is, in that respect, sympathetic to calls for the sorts of spatially-
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targeted, contextually-tailored policy -aking that are premised on the perception that 
“opportunities for growth exist in every region” and that “all [regions] have the potential to make 
substantive contributions to economic growth by achieving high levels of productivity” and, 
moreover, that the unlocking of that potential will be beneficial both to the wellbeing and welfare 
of the individuals these territories are home to, but the wider (i.e. national) economy most 
generally (Barca et al, 2012: 139-140).  
 
Our perspective, while not unique, in not universally held. Proponents of spatially-
targeted policy-making and the promotion of more geographically even growth are met by 
opposition from a school of thought, informed primarily by New Economic Geography and 
urban economics, that proposes that scarce resources are best spent not on promoting growth 
everywhere, but on the cultivation of dynamism in a select number of places and, relatedly, on 
ensuring that individuals then have access to these places or reap the benefits, directly or 
indirectly, of the economic activities they host.
1
 These so-called spatially-neutral approaches 
therefore do little to resolve, and could conceivably entrench or exacerbate, regional disparities. 
In fact, the World Bank’s 2009 World Development Report (World Bank, 2009), within which 
policies of this sort are perhaps most strongly advocated, asserts that regional disparities are 
essentially inevitable and efforts to spread growth are both in vain and inefficient.  
 
Regional inequalities are, however, consequential. They are both potential inhibitors of 
sustainable economic growth and catalysts of a range of socioeconomic and political ills. Simply 
stated, they cannot be ignored or treated as inevitable. It is therefore our view, for these and other 
reasons developed throughout the paper, that spatially-targeted policies that leverage local 
potential to resolve territorial inequalities and promote growth across the territorial spectrum in a 
positive-sum way are likely the most appropriate and sustainable way forward.  
 
Our endorsement of place-based, spatially-targeted policies is consistent with recent 
literature that has advocated for their use to cope with the rising tide of political populism and 
economic nationalism, that is, in many respects, a product of rampant territorial inequity; Storper 
                                                 
1
 See Barca et al. (2012) for a detailed discussion of the debate and tensions between spatially-blind/neutral and 
spatially-targeted policies. 
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(2018:248), for example, draws the link between regional divergence, not only in terms of 
income, but opportunity more generally, and changing political preferences and perspectives, 
noting that “the geographic polarization of opportunity seems to be mirrored in the geographical 
splits in political attitudes and voting behaviours”. Rodríguez-Pose (2018:206) suggests that 
stemming the rise of populism and the “challenges [they impose on] current economic and 
political systems” will necessarily involve promoting economic growth and broad-based 
development in places that have lagged behind or witnessed prolongued economic declinte. This 
implies providing those living in the so-called ‘places that don’t matter’ with economic 
opportunity. Both he and Iammarino et al., (2018) suggest, largely because of the suitability of 
spatially-targeted policies but also because of the likely inadequacies of past policies, that 
spatially-targeted development approaches are the most appropriate, if not the only way to do so. 
Rodríguez-Pose (2018:206) also, however, stresses that policies need to be “better” than those 
pursued in the past. Herein lies the contribution of this paper. The insights we provide and policy 
implications we derive can inform the design of more efficient, effective spatially-sensitive 
policies geared towards the promotion of development in underdeveloped, lagging territories and 
the resolution of spatial inequalities and the challenges they foster. 
 
1.1 Approaches to development in less developed areas 
 
Policy-makers in developed, emerging and developing economies have long relied on a 
range of strategic interventions to stimulate economic growth and socioeconomic development. 
The exact strategic approaches that they have turned to have been, in their specificities, as 
heterogeneous as the contexts in which they have been pursued. The vast majority of these 
approaches can, however, be assigned to one of four broad categories in accordance the ‘levers’ 
they pull to catalyse and promote growth. That is, development policies and strategies of late 
have tended to be based on one of the following development axes: (1) infrastructure expansion 
and development; (2) the attraction of inward investment; (3) the promotion of innovation and 




This paper aims to engage with these four broad policy types with a view to, first, assess 
and comment on the utility of these approaches in different development contexts, and, second, 
provide an indication of what exactly policy-makers should prioritise in the design and 
implementation of these strategic actions. It relies on a comparative case-study based qualitative 
analysis of a handful of development approaches pursued in a diversity of geographic contexts to 
do so. The overarching objective of the paper is to learn from these policies in order to better 
understand the steps that need be taken to increase the likelihood that development interventions 
contribute substantively to local or regional economic growth and development in what are often 
very heterogeneous contexts across the world.  
 
The cases, and by extension the analysis, are informed by a range of secondary sources. 
Academic studies and ex-post policy evaluations are employed not to assess or comment on the 
efficacy of the interventions per se, or pass judgement on whether they have amounted to 
successes or failures, but rather to form inferences relating to why a particular outcome 
materialised and identify the factors to which their success or failure are attributable. The paper 
therefore takes a markedly different tact to the quantitative policy analyses that have often 
preceded it. These econometrically-based exercises excel in offering comprehensive insights into 
the whether an approach, intervention or policy was successful (or not). They tend not, however, 
to be adequality (or certainly, as well) equipped to explore the all-important ‘why’. This 
research, on the other hand, is deliberately structured to provide insights of this nature, into the 
less tangible, less easily quantifiable but critically important factors behind the success or failure 
of regional development approaches. It is, in that respect, a useful, if not necessary, supplement 
to said quantitative exploration.  
 
The cases are presented in considerable detail over the course of two subsections, 
touching, where appropriate, on the specificities of the interventions, the processes by which they 
were developed; the actions and instruments by which they were composed; details of their 
implementation and execution. The outcomes, products and impacts of the actions are addressed 




The lessons drawn from this review of a series of successful and unsuccessful 
development strategies are four-fold. First, development strategies informed not by one, but by 
several complementary development theories, perspectives and schools of thought, and, 
consequently, composed of multiple related and mutually-reinforcing actions and interventions 
across development areas tend to deliver better results. Second, strategic approaches to the 
promotion of economic growth that are solidly grounded in robust diagnoses of the advantages, 
opportunities, challenges and weaknesses of a city or region – that is specifically-tailored to local 
realities – are generally more successful. Third, the awareness of where exactly the territory is 
situated on the development spectrum is crucial, as a territory’s level of development and, more 
precisely, its proximity to infrastructure, human capital and technology frontiers will determine 
whether there is any scope for investment in or attention to these development axes. Fourth, and 
finally, the institutional dimension cannot be left un- or even under-addressed in the design and 
implementation of policy interventions. Oftentimes, the environments in which territorial 
development policies or strategies are most direly needed are also those plagued by the greatest 
institutional deficiencies. These shortcomings and inefficiencies manifest themselves in any 
number of ways and can seriously undermine the returns of even the most robustly and carefully 
designed territorial development policies. This does not, however, mean that territorial 
development strategies should not be pursued in institutionally unfavourable environments. 
Rather, an awareness of institutional barriers and deficiencies will reinforce the returns of 
development strategies, making it imperative –,anywhere but all the more in areas with poor 
institutions – that capacity building efforts, technical development exercises and institutional 
reforms are integrated directly into territorial development strategies. This will contribute to 
ensure that the potential effectiveness of development approaches is not compromised by 
institutional inadequacies.  
 
These four lessons are supplemented later in the paper with more general guidance 
relating not to where each of the four policy types of interest can, or should, be employed, but 
rather to how territorial approaches to development – irrespective of the development axis or 
axes to which they are oriented – should be designed for territories at different points in their 
development trajectories. We propose that that the strategic approaches employed by 
differentially developed territories should differ in terms of their relative complexity – 
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conceptualised as a function of the number and diversity of individual interventions – and the 
breadth of their strategic scopes – understood as the narrowness of the development outcomes or 
objectives by which a strategy is guided – in ways that reflect the nature of the most immediate 
development challenges with which they are faced. We assert that: (i) the most economically 
disadvantaged of territories should pursue approaches that are simple in nature and narrow in 
strategic scope; (ii) that less economically developed territories should opt for simple, but more 
broadly-oriented strategies; (iii) that emerging territories should rely on broad-based approaches 
that are, on the other hand, more complex and integrated in nature; and (iv) that more developed 
areas will need to design strategies that are, again, complex but are narrowly and precisely 
targeted to affect change.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief 
introduction to the four broad types of development policies, and to the various theories of 
economic growth and development from which they have been derived. Its objective is not to 
provide an exhaustive review of the theories from which development policy has drawn its 
inspiration. Doing so is beyond the scope and intention of the paper and, moreover, would prove 
redundant given the volume of literature already dedicated to doing so. Rather, it is our intention, 
with this section, to provide the reader with a cursory, easily digestible introduction to relevant 
concepts, theories and literature. In that respect, it is included to cultivate a base of understanding 
or point of departure that will ultimately aid in their processing and application of the cases, 
inferences, conclusions and assertions that follow.  Section 3 reviews a number of the 
development policies and strategies that have been pursued by a mix of developed, emerging and 
developing countries in an effort to identify, on a case-by-case basis, the factors to which the 
success (Section 3.2) or failure (Section 3.1) of each is most readily attributable. It will consider, 
among other things, how the design of the policy/strategy, its implementation or execution, and 
the socioeconomic and institutional context within which it was pursued have mediated or 
shaped its outcomes. Section 4 compares ‘strategies of waste’ to the ‘strategies of gain’ presented 
in the section that precedes to derive and provide a series of policy implications. Section 5 
contemplates the nature of the development challenges by which different types of territories are 
faced and proposes a taxonomy of development strategies that features four broad categories of 
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interventions each of which is more (or less) contextually suitable for territories at different 
points on the ‘development spectrum’.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theories of economic growth and development and the evolution of 
development policy 
 
Infrastructure-driven development, infrastructure-oriented policies, and the neoclassical growth 
theory 
 
Few development strategies have been as ubiquitously employed as infrastructure-
oriented development policies.
2
 Infrastructure-oriented approaches to development find their 
conceptual underpinning in the hitherto dominant neoclassical growth theory (e.g. Solow, 1956; 
Swan, 1956; Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). In a neoclassical 
framework, economic growth is understood to be governed by the relative availability of 
different factors of production: technology, physical capital and labour. However, technology 
and labour are considered exogenous factors, meaning that growth is fundamentally achieved by 
increasing physical capital, often proxied by infrastructure. Infrastructure is conceptualised either 
as a factor of production itself (i.e. as ‘public capital’) or an influence on the productivity of 
other factors of production (e.g. Romp and de Haan, 2007). Investing in and increasing a 
region’s stock of infrastructure is therefore thought to impel economic growth directly (i.e. as an 
input to processes of economic growth) or indirectly, by facilitating the more efficient 





Guided by the perception that a sufficiently developed network of physical – 
transportation, power, telecommunications, among other types – infrastructure is a prerequisite 
for development (e.g. Calderón and Servén, 2004) and by the expectation that infrastructure 
                                                 
2
 Dillinger (2007:29), for example, refers to infrastructure-led initiatives as “time-honored [approaches] to regional 
development”. Similarly, Barca et al. (2012:137) assert that “development policies have until now generally 




 See Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) or Straub (2007) for a more nuanced and developed discussion. 
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impinges on factors mobility and productivity, policy-makers have primarily resorted to devising 
and implementing strategies that rely on the provision and upgrading of various types of physical 
infrastructure as a key investment – if not there key investment – for economic growth. 
 
Inward investment strategies and growth pole theory  
 
A second category of development strategies includes the inward investment-oriented 
strategies that were borne out of the ‘growth pole theories’, most readily associated with the 
work of Perroux (1950, 1955) and Hirschman (1958).
 4
 Both Perroux and Hirschman observed 
that economic growth is not evenly distributed across space and that it occurs in and, in turn, 
diffuses out from a relatively small number of locations – ‘growth poles’. This observation has 
informed a number of policies that rely on the channelling of resources to existing or newly 
established agglomerations of economic actors as the most efficient way to promote economic 
growth and development in lagging regions. This approach entails targeting areas with greater 
economic potential within a region or country, whose success would, in time, yield more 
geographically widespread benefits (Parr, 1999).  Drawing on the perception in growth pole 
theories that the dynamism of these so-called ‘poles’ or ‘points’ is most readily attributable to the 
hosting of a leading or ‘propulsive’ (Perroux, 1955) industry or set of industries, inward 
investment and growth pole policies have been active in pursuing the attraction of large, often 
more productive and technologically advanced firms (and by extension the industries to which 
they belong) to less developed regions with a view to lay the foundation for the emergence of a 
growth pole capable of catalysing and supporting region-wide economic success and dynamism 
(Parr, 1999).  
 
Special economic zones, industrial parks and science and technology parks are perhaps 
the most notable of the more specific interventions that fall under the umbrella of ‘inward 
investment-oriented strategies’. At the heart of any inward investment-oriented initiative, 
however, irrespective of the guise in which it exists, is the perception that large, especially 
dynamic firms operating in ‘propulsive’, high-potential industries are catalysts for development 
and, moreover, that the attraction of one or more of these firms to a lagging region, via the 
                                                 
4
 See Parr (1999) for a comprehensive review of the origins and development of growth pole-types strategies. 
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provision of fiscal and other incentives, can often be sufficient to reverse its economic fortunes 
and ignite self-reinforcing processes of economic growth. 
 
Human capital, knowledge, innovation and the endogenous growth theory 
 
 The development of the endogenous growth theory gave rise to a set of policies and 
strategies that are markedly different from the infrastructure and inward investment-oriented 
approaches that preceded them (e.g. Romer, 1986, 1990; Lucas, 1988; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; 
Grossman and Helpman, 1994). The endogenous growth theory, by endogenising technology and 
human capital, brought human resources, education and skills (Lucas, 1988) and knowledge, 
technological change and innovation (Romer, 1986; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1994) to the fore in development thinking. Policy-makers, following suit, became 
increasingly concerned with the promotion of innovation and the provision of education and 
training, with the expectation that knowledge-intensive, innovative activities and an able labour 
force especially in less-developed regions could catalyse economic growth and facilitate the 
reversal of their economic fortunes.  
 
 Within this framework, the setting of regional R&D expenditure targets and initiatives to 
increase public and private R&D investment and stimulate the generation of knowledge has been 
a favoured strategic approach for the promotion of innovation (World Bank, 2010). More 
holistic, systems-of-innovation-type policies that match more traditional policy instruments with 
a focus on the encouragement of interactions, cooperation and collaboration between economic 
actors to achieve this end have also become increasingly common in recent years (e.g. Tödtling 
and Trippl, 2005; World Bank, 2010; OECD, 2012). Moreover, policy-makers have relied 
mainly on general investment in all levels of education and on a range of more-narrowly targeted 
skills-development initiatives, vocational schemes, lifelong-learning initiatives, and other 
training programmes to promote human capital development (e.g. OECD, 2015). 
 
Cluster-based development policies and new economic geography and urban economics 
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 The final type of policy intervention considered here emerged from a number of 
theoretical perspectives that explore and, in turn, underscore the importance of the co-location of 
economic actors and activities for productivity, innovation and, ultimately, economic 
performance and growth: cluster theory, new economic geography and urban economics. Despite 
considerable differences between the three strands, a central premise of all of them is that the 
agglomeration of economic activities – and, consequently, a high density of economic actors in 
any particular place – gives rise to a host of productivity-enhancing externalities from which co-
located actors benefit (e.g. Porter, 1990; Krugman 1991; Fujita et al., 2000; Fujita and Thisse, 
2002; Duranton and Puga, 2004; Storper and Venables, 2004; Glaeser, 2010). Co-location is 
understood as a facilitator of interactions, cooperation and collaborations between physically-
proximate economic actors. It enables, inter alia, the sharing of resources, the establishment of 
efficient input-output linkages, and the realization of economies of scale and scope. Co-location 
also supports the transfer and exchange of knowledge, information and ideas within (i.e. 
Marshall-Arrow-Romer spillovers) and between (i.e. Jacobian spillovers) sectors and industries –
and, the economic actors that compose them – that is thought to foster and support the innovation 
and technological progress that spur economic growth. 
 
Development policies following these strands have paid particular attention, on the one 
hand, to the generation and/or consolidation of different types of clusters – including related 
types of intervention, such as science and technology parks, innovation parks/hubs, industrial 
parks/clusters and the like – while, on the other, they have sought to promote the more dynamic 
urban centres within specific countries, which often coincide with larger and more dense 
agglomerations. Cluster-based and new economic geography and urban economics related 
policies adopted many different forms, but often involve, in different guises, the development of 
infrastructure, the provision of incentives to encourage and facilitate the agglomeration of 
economic activity, and actions to promote interaction and the emergence of networks. Different 
types of cluster policies and the pursuit of agglomeration have become popular with policy-




                                                 
5
 Martin and Sunley (2003:23), for example, assert that “few other ideas can begin to rival the current popularity of 
the clusters notion amongst economic practitioners and national and regional policy communities”. 
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3. Comparing ‘strategies of waste’ and ‘strategies of gain’ 
 
Development strategies all over the world and, in particular, in developing and emerging 
countries, are frequently the children of different economic growth and development theories. 
Normally one of the aforementioned strands informs and structures the type of development 
intervention, leading to policies that put the emphasis, depending on the dominant strand, on 
infrastructure building, growth poles, skills and innovation, or clusters and agglomeration. Most 
development interventions usually remain firmly embedded in one approach and rarely combine 
elements from different theories or, whenever they do so, subjugate other types of intervention to 
the main development axis promoted by the chosen theory. The result is generally highly 
unbalanced forms of development intervention, which stress one development axis above all 
others as the key driver for economic growth and employment generation. 
 
In this section, we will use specific examples to overview these policies at work. We will 
underscore how an excessive focus on one development axis often results, depending on local 
conditions, on what can be called strategies of waste, that is, development interventions that 
leave the treated territory in the medium- and long-run in a similar or worse condition than 
before the intervention, despite sometimes having short-term positive effects. We will also argue 
that, by contrast, interventions that combine different development strands and that adapt the 
resulting strategy to the characteristics and needs of each territory, are more likely to succeed in 
yielding medium- and long-term sustainable economic outcomes. These are what we call 
strategies of gain.  
 
The distinction between strategies of gain and waste is an admittedly binary one. In 
practice, development approaches, including the ones documented in the following subsections, 
are rarely complete successes or failures (though the latter is conceivably more common than the 
former). At a point, however, especially in an analytical exercise like this, a line must be drawn 
and cases classified in a manner that facilitates comparison and the eventual formulation of 
inferences relating to what differentiates one group from the other. The classification of our 
chosen cases as successes or failures (i.e. as strategies of gain or waste) is a reflection the 
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tangible and, where relevant less tangible, development impacts and outcomes they yielded and 
is informed by the perception and apparent consensus (apparent in the literature by which the 
cases are informed) regarding the efficacy of each of the strategic approaches. 
 
Several factors were considered when selecting the cases presented in the following 
subsections. First, the examination of each of the aforementioned policy types is absolutely 
necessary for an exploration of this nature where the concern is not necessarily identifying which 
narrow policy type is best, but rather identifying under what conditions a given strategy should 
be pursued or what steps can be taken to maximise the likelihood of a policy delivering on its 
objectives. Accordingly, infrastructure-, inward investment-, innovation and human capital- and 
cluster-based interventions all feature in the proceeding sections. Second, we, very deliberately, 
sought cases from a diversity of geographies and development contexts and, where applicable, 
with different sectoral or industrial foci. While the selection of cases from a single geography, 
context or industry could conceivably serve to ‘control’ for narrow, specific contextual factors 
that condition the success or failure of development approaches, doing so would preclude (i) the 
illustration and exploration of the diversity of challenges by which development policy, broadly 
defined, can be faced; (ii) the unearthing and analysis of a range of, in some cases not 
immediately obvious, best practices; and (iii) ultimately, the formulation of the ‘higher-level’, 
more widely generalisable inferences, lessons and conclusions that the paper seeks to provide. 
Second, we focused on development interventions. The third consideration was a practical one. 
For us to comment on why a particular policy or strategy was or was not effective (i.e. amounted 
to a strategy of gain or waste), we needed cases where a concerted effort had been made both to 
document in suitable detail both the specificities of the intervention – including its motivations, 
overarching aims and objectives; its leaders, stakeholders, and other relevant parties responsible 
for or affected by its outcomes; the process by which it was designed; the steps and actions by 
which it was/is composed; and the way in which it was implemented and executed – and 
monitor, evaluate and report the immediately tangible outputs and impacts as well as the more 
general, less tangible development outcomes. 
 
3.1. Strategies of waste 
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The growth and development policies and strategies highlighted in Section 2 have been 
implemented in a diversity of contexts. Some have found success and served as catalysts for 
meaningful economic growth and development. Many others, however, have not. This latter 
category of approaches can be referred to as strategies of waste. Stated simply, strategies of 
waste are, for the purposes of this document, development approaches that achieved little in the 
way of economic development and, ultimately, amounted to not much more than a waste of 
scarce resources.  Strategies of waste, as the subsections that follow confirm, exist in any number 
of forms and are by no means confined to one particular theoretical approach, geography, or 
context. 
 
The limited returns to transportation infrastructure investment in the European Union 
 
The sorts of infrastructure-oriented development strategies that emerged from 
neoclassical theories of economic growth and development have been pursued with particular 
vigour in developed and developing countries alike. Few policy-making bodies, however, have 
displayed a greater, more sustained commitment to and belief in infrastructure investment as a 
means to impel economic growth and development than the European Union.  
 
Adhering to the notion that “efficient and sustainable transport services and infrastructure 
are vital to exploiting the strengths of all EU regions and supporting the internal market thereby 
facilitating economic and social cohesion” (European Commission, 2014: 3), authorities have 
prioritised investment in infrastructure and have channelled significant amounts of resources 
towards a wide array of intra- and inter-regional transportation infrastructure-oriented projects. 
In the 2014- 2020 funding period alone, the European Regional Development Fund and the 
European Union Cohesion fund are set to spend €71.5bn on “a range of investment priorities to 
promote sustainable transport and remove bottlenecks in key network infrastructures”.
6
 Another 
€24.05bn will be spent on a series of projects to develop and expand the continent’s inter-
                                                 
6
 Network infrastructure in transport and energy: https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/themes/7 
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regional transportation infrastructure network via the Connecting Europe Facility, a funding 




Increases, especially of this magnitude, in transportation infrastructure expenditure 
should, according to neoclassical growth theory augment regional capital-to-labour ratios and 
lead to the proportional improvements in productivity that are anticipated to drive economic 
growth and enhance economic dynamism.  
 
Such predictions do not, however, seem to have to come to fruition (e.g. Cappelen et al., 
2003; Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004; Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). Considerable 
investment in transport infrastructure in the less developed regions of the European Union has 
not yielded the expected results. In a cross-regional macroeconomic investigation into the 
relationship between regional economic performance and regional transportation infrastructure 
endowments, Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose (2012: 489) find little evidence of a significant link 
between regional infrastructure endowments and economic performance, suggesting that the 
European Union’s infrastructure-centric approach to development may be more akin to a strategy 
of waste than to one of significant gain. This, coupled with evidence of significant relationships 
between economic dynamism and a host of other socioeconomic factors and influences, has 
raised doubts about the sensibility of the European Union’s singular concern for transportation 
infrastructure. Some voices have even advocated for a revaluation of the privileged position that 
has traditionally been assigned to infrastructure expansion in the European Union’s strategic 
efforts to promote economic growth and cohesion (e.g. Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). 
 
There are a multitude of factors to which the limited returns to infrastructure spending in 
the European Union are attributable. Chief among them, however, is likely that infrastructure 
investment is subject to diminishing returns and moreover that there is a ‘threshold’ –  exceeded 
by the European Union – beyond which investment in infrastructure is unlikely to yield much in 
the way of economic development (e.g. Canning and Pedroni, 2004; de la Fuente, 2010; 
Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). Although well-targeted expenditure that alleviates 
bottlenecks or addresses specific inadequacies can generate considerable economic returns, even 
                                                 
7
 Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) Transport: https://ec.europa.eu/inea/connecting-europe-facility/cef-transport 
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in environments characterised by well-developed infrastructure endowments, once a territory’s 
most fundamental infrastructure needs are met – as is the case in the majority of the regions of 
the European Union, including many of its least developed areas – indiscriminate expenditure on 
the expansion of its infrastructure network is more likely to result in duplications and 
redundancies than in increases in productivity and economic dynamism.  
 
Relatively poor institutional quality, especially in many of the European Union’s less 
developed regions, is also to blame for the limited returns to transportation infrastructure 
expenditure (e.g. Crescenzi et al., 2016). Self-interested politicians and decision-makers 
operating in weaker institutional contexts may respond to perverse incentives and elect to 
channel resources towards projects may give way to immediate private or electoral returns but 
are ultimately not sustainable nor like to produce lasting benefits in the medium- or longer-term. 
Many of the ‘white elephant’ projects that are scattered across the European Union are, in part, 
attributable to this phenomenon (Crescenzi et al. 2016: 559).  
 
The Ciudad Real Airport in Spain is a prototypical example of a ‘white elephant’. The 
airport, which opened in 2008, was supposed to provide a much-needed boost to the local 
economy in the form of 6000 direct jobs.
8
 Built at a cost in excess of €1bn, the airport, however, 
sat largely idle until 2012 when bankruptcy forced its closure.
9
 The Toledo-Albacete-Cuenca 
high-speed rail connection represents a similarly misguided expenditure of resources on 
infrastructure development. The establishment of a high-speed rail line linking the Spanish cities 
of Toledo, Albacete and Cuenca – with a combined population of 310,000 – managed to reduce 
travel time between Toledo and Albacete from two hours and 28 minutes to two hours and five 
minutes and was seen as way to increase the connectedness and, in turn, the economic dynamism 
of the three provincial capitals linked by the new rail connection. The line opened in December 
of 2010, but concerns about its financial unsustainability led to its closure just seven months 
                                                 
8
 The white elephants that dragged Spain into the red: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-18855961 
  
9
 Spain’s Ciudad Airport sold at auction for €10,000: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33578949 
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later, in July 2011. The reason: the service was used by an average of nine people per day but 




These two cases, and other similar ‘white elephants’ exemplify both the notion of limited 
returns to infrastructure spending beyond a certain minimum threshold – particularly in weak 
institutional conditions – and the dangers associated with pursuing projects with little more than 
their most-immediate impact in mind. Neither project addressed or targeted a particular 
bottleneck nor debilitating infrastructure shortage; if anything, they provided duplications of pre-
existing and not congested services.
11
 It is difficult, for example, to comprehend why a 
provincial capital with a population, at the time, of 75,000 would need an airport with a 4 km 
runway and the capacity to host 10m passengers a year especially when Madrid’s Barajas 
International Airport was less than 190 kilometres away. Similarly, a time saving of 23 minutes 
on a route that was ultimately used by less than 10 passengers per day does not seem overly 
consequential. Neither project was sufficiently informed or guided by even the most basic 
background research that could, in theory, justify their existence, meaning that a substantive 
contribution to economic growth and development was just a pipedream. The real justification 
for both projects was nothing more than short-term electoral gain plus, possibly, decision-makers 
aiming to reap the fruits of corruption (Crescenzi et al., 2016). 
 




The perception that the formation of a single especially dynamic agglomeration of 
economic actors and activity – a ‘growth pole’ – is sufficient to trigger economic growth and 
development across the entirety of even the most underdeveloped regions has led to the 
proliferation of a variety of inward investment-oriented strategies across the developing and 
emerging world (e.g. World Bank, 2008; Rodríguez-Pose and Hardy, 2014). The track record of 
these inward investment-oriented approaches – most of which have assumed the form of special 
                                                 
10




 Albalate et al. (2015) provide a detailed discussion of the oversupply of infrastructure in the Spanish context. 
 
12
 The proceeding discussion is based on a World Bank (2016a) review of Peru’s experience with special economic 
zones.  
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economic zones or industrial zones or parks – has, however, been mixed, when not outright 
discouraging (Farole and Akini, 2011: 4). Recent empirical investigation has, in fact, provided a 
clear indication that many of the special economic zones that have been established in emerging 
contexts have failed as catalysts for more widespread economic growth and development (Frick 
et al., 2018). This has, in turn, bred concerns about the general effectiveness of the special 
economic zone programmes that have been pursued with particular enthusiasm across the 
developing and emerging world and, in turn, about the sensibility of the continued pursuit of 
investment-oriented strategies in such 
environments (Frick et al., 2018). 
 
Peru is but one of the many countries 
that have attempted to establish ‘growth 
poles’ in its lesser-developed, lagging areas 
in hopes that the expected dynamism and 
success of these agglomerations would 
eventually spread to other lagging behind 
territories in the country. Peru’s engagement 
with special economic zones is a reasonably 
long, but unfortunately not particularly 
successful one. The passing of Law 28519 
in 1996 led to the establishment of three 
special economic zones in the cities of Ilo, 
Matarani and Tacna, respectively. 
Envisioned by authorities as vehicles for the 
promotion export-led growth and economic 
competitiveness and as “economic growth 
poles in their host communities” (World 
Bank, 2016a: 23), four more zones have since been proposed and ‘designated’. Of the country’s 
seven designated zones, however, only four are operational, and moreover, only one of these can 
lay any claim to have been mildly successful in achieving its economic development goals 
(Figure 2). Paita CETICOS, which is the largest (940ha) and also, because of its proximity to a 
Figure 2 - Special economic zones sites in Peru; Authors' 
elaboration 
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port, the most favourably geographically situated zone in Peru, is considered by Peruvian 
authorities “to be the most successful of the country’s zones from an economic standpoint” 
(World Bank, 2016a: 36). The zone has led to the creation of 1200 jobs and has supported an 
increase in trade and exporting, much of which is attributable to SMEs. The development 
impacts of the other three zones range from modest (Tacna Free Zone) to virtually non-existent. 
(Matarani CETICOS and Ilo CETICOS).
13
 Why have the outcomes of and returns to the 
Peruvian zone programme fallen so far short of expectations? While each of the country’s zones 
have suffered by contextually-unique challenges and obstacles, the underperformance of the 
programme as a whole is attributable to a number of factors, shortcomings and inefficiencies that 
fall into one of three broadly defined categories: (1) planning failures; (2) institutional failure or 
(3) failures in execution.  
 
The planning failures were twofold. First, it was concluded that the country’s zones were 
established in the ‘wrong areas’. That is, because the zones were conceived and envisioned as 
catalysts for regional economic development, they were established – without sufficient concern 
for ex ante local conditions, characteristics and attributes– in lagging-behind regions of the 
country. This “ad hoc” (World Bank, 2016a: 45) selection process led, on the one hand, to the 
establishment of zones in less-economically dynamic territories with underdeveloped 
socioeconomic fabrics. This inhibited their capacity to (i) attract and sustain economic activity 
and to (ii) capitalise on that activity and push region-wide socioeconomic development and, on 
the other, a failure to establish zones in “more promising” intermediate or even more 
economically advanced areas where the development impacts of a zone may have probably been 
greater (World Bank, 2016a: 43).  
 
                                                 
 
13
 The development impacts of Tacna Free Zone, which is situated near the Chilean border in the southern part of the 
country, have been more on the more modest end of the spectrum. There is evidence to suggest that the zone has 
provided a boost to the tourism and hospitality sectors in Tacna (World Bank, 2016a:33). The zone has, however, 
suffered from a fair share of logistical, institutional, infrastructural and other challenges. Moreover, the zone remains 
domestically-oriented and has not served as a facilitator of trade and export-growth nor has it served as a particularly 
powerful engine for employment creation. The development impacts of the Matarani CETICOS have been even 
more underwhelming. The World Bank (2016a:39) maintains that “with its limited number of investors and a lack of 
focus on the real potential investment opportunities, it cannot be said that the [Matarani CETICOS] has truly had 
any significant impact on the development of its host region”. 
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Second, insufficient attention was paid to the “country’s comparative advantages, 
strategic opportunities and development opportunities” (World Bank, 2016a: 11) when 
establishing the zones’ sectoral foci. This resulted in mismatches between the activities that were 
actually prioritised by authorities and the endowments, advantages, and opportunities by which 
the zones and the regions in which they are situated are characterised. Overall, there was a 
general failure to pursue “the most promising economic activities” (World Bank, 2016a: 48) that 
could have perhaps offered a greater development potential. 
 
The programme’s institutional failures are also twofold. First, Peru’s special economic 
zone programme is composed of two discrete, but markedly similar, zone legal ‘regimes’ 
(stemming from two separate laws that were passed to facilitate the development of the country’s 
special economic zone strategy). The CETICOS zones exist under the first regime. The second 
regime is associated exclusively with the Tacna Free Zone. The consequences of this are 
numerous. Firms, investors and other economic actors may be deterred by unnecessarily high 
degrees of administrative and bureaucratic complexity, stemming from the need to understand 
and navigate the two regimes (World Bank, 2016a: 49). The co-existence and consequent need to 
monitor and enforce what are “from a legal and administrative perspective [similar regimes]” 
(World Bank, 2016a: 50) also likely represents an inefficient deployment of scarce financial and 
human resources. 
 
Second, responsibility for the regulation of the zones is shared, almost exclusively, across 
several subnational authorities; “[little] regulatory authority is exercised at the national level” 
(World Bank, 2016: 53). This highly fragmented regulatory framework not only compromises 
the cohesion and effectiveness of the overall regulatory governance regime, it can also increase 
the compliance costs incurred by firms. Fragmented frameworks like these tend also to be prone 
inefficiencies, duplications and forgone synergies. 
 
The failures that fall under into the final category relate to the way in which the 
programme has been pursued and operationalised. The private sector, for one, has been 
insufficiently engaged in the programme as a whole. The underperformance of the zones, and the 
related infrastructural deficiencies by which they have been plagued are attributable, at least in 
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part, to the development, management and operation of these zones almost exclusively by 
public-sector bodies. These bodies can be less efficient and experienced than and often lack the 
same incentives as their private sector counterparts.
14
 These infrastructural shortages are a sign 
of public sector failure and are viewed as a “significant constraint to growth” (World Bank, 
2016a: 68) and to the dynamism and overall performance of the zones.  
 
Additionally, insufficient attention was paid to the ensuring that stocks of skilled labour 
were sufficiently developed so as to meet the needs of the zones and the firms that occupy them; 
the shortages of skilled human capital by which Peru is characterised act as yet another deterrent 
to productive activity and investment (World Bank, 2016a: 72).  
 
Finally, it appears that the financial instruments and tools that authorities elected to 
employ and the measures they relied on to incentivise firms, while generous (i.e. income and 
other tax exemptions), did not necessarily mitigate the specific issues that deter investment or 
hamper firm (and, by extension, zone) performance (World Bank, 2016a). Simply stated, there 
was an insufficient degree of coherence between the issues that needed to be addressed and the 
tools that policy-makers employed to do so. 
 
R&D-oriented innovation policy in the European Union 
 
Knowledge, technological development and innovation are, according to the endogenous 
growth theory, preeminent drivers of economic growth and dynamism. Promoting innovative 
activity is increasingly perceived as a way to lay the foundations for the increases in productivity 
that are effectively prerequisite to economic growth, especially of more advanced economies. 
Therefore, knowledge-intensive, innovative activity, and the shoring up of the innovative 
capacities of lagging-behind regions in particular, has long been a priority of the European 
Union. 
                                                 
14
 A related consequence of the failure to engage the private sector in the operation of zones themselves meant that 
public bodies had to assume responsibility not only for their management and operation, but also for their regulation 
and oversight. This means that (i) authorities may have been overburdened by tasks for which, in some cases, day 
not have the competencies to perform and (ii) the failure to separate responsibility for operation from that for 




The most concerted effort made thus far by the European Union in this direction has 
involved the establishment and pursuit of research and development (R&D) expenditure targets 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Wilkie, 2017a). Shortly after the release of the Lisbon Strategy (2000-
2010), which detailed how the European Union would evolve into “the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” (European Commission, 2010: 21), an ‘action 
plan’ was released in which it was established that all member states would aim to increase 
levels of R&D investment to 3 percent of GDP by 2010
15
 – a target that has since been readopted 
the European Union’s Europe 2020 economic growth and development plan. There is little 
question that the establishment of this target has given way to greater expenditure on R&D 
activities across the European Union. That said, there is still considerable progress to be made if 




R&D-oriented innovation and growth strategies, the European Union’s included, are the 
direct by-product of more traditional, linear conceptualisations of the innovative process (e.g. 
Maclaurin, 1953; Grilliches, 1979) in which innovation is understood as a direct consequence of 
investment in, and the generation of, new knowledge. Socioeconomic and institutional factors 
tend not feature in these ‘linear models of innovation’, which simply predict that greater R&D 
investment will result in increases in innovative output irrespective of where and under what 
conditions that process transpires. This neglect of, and related failure to integrate complementary 
strategic interventions to address contextual conditions, features and characteristics is an 
important reason why policy approaches inspired and guided singularly by linear 
conceptualisations of innovation have often failed to stimulate innovation and innovative-driven 
economic performance in ‘innovation-averse’ (Rodríguez-Pose, 1999), economically 
disadvantaged territories. 
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 Average R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP for European Union Member States in 2015 was 1.65%. 
European Aggregate R&D expenditure as a percentage of Europe’s Aggregate GDP was 2.03% in the same year 




Figure 2 - R&D expenditure in the European Union; Authors’ elaboration 
 
Europe’s lagging regions display, on balance, a relatively weak facility for the translation 
of R&D expenditure and knowledge into innovation and economic performance (e.g. Oughton et 
al., 2002; Sterlacchini, 2008; Aristonvik, 2012; Charlot et al., 2012). Moreover, recent 
quantitative analysis has indicated that the outcomes of the most recent increases in the R&D 
effort in Europe’s less-developed areas have not delivered the expected returns (Rodríguez-Pose 
and Wilkie, 2017a). The Lisbon Strategy-inspired increases in R&D expenditure are found to be 
associated with a modest increase in the generation of innovative output, though closer 
examination reveals that this positive correlation is driven entirely by private sector’s knowledge 
generation efforts. In many European less developed regions innovative capacities are all but 
completely detached with the public R&D expenditure that constitutes a large share of total R&D 
commitment. The concerted R&D efforts of Europe’s lagging regions have not necessarily been 
linked to improvements in regional economic performance or decreases in unemployment.  
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The exact factors to which the underperformance of this unidimensional policy approach 
is attributed are numerous. Many, if not all, however, relate to the fact that R&D expenditure was 
prioritised indiscriminately across the entirety of the European Union with little if any, 
consideration for the way in which the characteristics, attributes and conditions of its 
heterogeneous regions might affect their capacity to mobilise and productively exploit it 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Wilkie, 2017a).  
 
A neglect of the aforementioned characteristics, attributes and conditions represents a 
failure to consider the very factors that are understood to condition a region’s capacity to absorb, 
mobilise and ultimately exploit R&D expenditure and knowledge. That is, empirical analyses of 
the European context have revealed that the process by which knowledge is transformed into 
economic performance is strongly mediated by the socioeconomic and institutional 
characteristics of the region in which it takes place (e.g. Bilbao-Osorio and Rodríguez-Pose, 
2004; Crescenzi, 2005; Charlot et al., 2012; Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 2015). A key 
implication of this is that any weaknesses in a region’s socioeconomic or institutional fabric are 
anticipated to erode its capacity to capitalise on R&D investment or activity. This has seriously 
compromised the capacity of many of Europe’s lagging regions to efficiently mobilise pre-crisis 
increases in R&D investment and activity and translate the knowledge they were anticipated to 
generate into innovation and, in turn, economic dynamism and development.  
 
In short, the overall ineffectiveness of the recent R&D drive has been a function of the 
insufficient attention paid by policy-makers to other factors that condition the relationships 
between knowledge and innovation and, relatedly, innovation and economic performance.  
 
Supply-side approaches to the development of human capital: learning from the Filipino 
experience 
 
The human capital development initiatives and strategies pursued by developing and 
emerging countries, especially in the latter part of the 20
th
 century, displayed a marked focus on 
the provision and in turn, supply of skills and training (e.g. di Gropello, 2006; ELLA, 2013; Phan 
and Coxhead, 2014). Actions in this direction were viewed, in accordance with the prevailing 
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endogenous theories of economic growth (e.g. Lucas, 1988), as viable ways to increase the skills 
and capabilities, and, in turn, the productivity of individuals and the regions they lived in. There 
was, however, an equally ubiquitous tendency to disregard the way and extent to which educated 
and/or skilled persons would be absorbed by the labour market. Herein lies the problem. Skilled 
individuals contribute to economic growth via their engagement in productive activity. However, 
the absence of a concerted effort to ensure opportunity existed for them to do so is what would 
prove to be the undoing of what were insufficiently integrated, unidimensional supply-oriented 
policies. The Filipino experience is, in that respect, a cautionary tale; it exemplifies the dangers 
associated with and the challenges that can arise from ill-conceived and insufficiently integrated 
supply-side human capital development strategies (Phan and Coxhead, 2014). 
 
As of 2010 the Philippines had 470 nursing training programmes (Dimaya et al., 2012: 4) 
that, by 2006, were already producing an average of 20,000 nurses a year (Lorenzo et al., 2007: 
1409). A robust training system, such as the one described, could have been sufficient to address 
the healthcare needs of the large Filipino population. However, despite having trained a large 
number of nurses over a considerable amount of time, the Philippines still suffers from 
pronounced shortages of nurses that are attributable to the large scale, almost systematic 
emigration of Filipino-trained nurses, who find limited well-paid opportunities at home. 
 
This ‘brain-drain’ phenomenon, which dates back to the early 1970s (Alburo and Abella, 
2002), is by no means confined the healthcare sector; it affects a diversity of sectors and 
industries and has transformed the Philippines into one the world’s “leading labour exporting 
[countries]” (Dimaya et al., 2012). In the case of nurses.
17
 brain-drain-induced shortages 
contributed to the complete closure of 200 hospitals and the partial closure of 800 more between 
2003 and 2005 alone (Lorenzo et al., 2007: 1414). They have also been linked to the marked 
increases in patient to nurse ratios that have been observed in recent years (Lorenzo et al., 2007). 
The emigration of more experienced and qualified nurses is even anticipated to result in higher 
                                                 
17
 Lorenzo et al. (2007:1408), for example, note that nurses [constitute] the largest group of professional workers 
abroad”. Similarly, Finch (2013:E557) highlights that “between 2004 and 2010, nearly 72,000 nurses were newly 
employed or rehired abroad”. 
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numbers of nursing positions being filled by younger, less-experienced nurses (Dimaya, 2012: 
4).   
 
Qualitative research has revealed that the brain-drain is driven by a host of ‘push’ and 
‘pull’ factors that motivate Filipino nurses to actively seek employment opportunities abroad. 
Many of these factors, however, relate to or stem from an undersupply of employment 
opportunities of a quality that is comparable to those available to Filipino-trained nurses 
elsewhere in the world.
18
 The brain-drain is, in effect, a demand-driven, or at least demand-
related, problem (e.g. Phan and Coxhead, 2014).  
 
Nurse shortages in the Philippines are attributable not to an unavailability of training or, 
relatedly, an inability on the behalf of the country’s education and training system to meet the 
demands of the healthcare sectors, but rather to adverse demand-side conditions. The failure by 
successive Filipino governments and the private sector alike to address the lack of local 
opportunity has driven Filipino-trained nurses to pursue, better paid, higher quality employment 
opportunities elsewhere, giving rise to a situation where any benefits that could have conceivably 
arisen from a what would seem a reasonably mature and well-developed education system are 
essentially forgone.  
 




 Regions the world over have, often hoping to cultivate the next Silicon Valley, Bangalore 
or Hsinchu, turned to cluster-based development policies and strategies. Few, however, have 
managed to do achieve considerable local admit success. Instances of failure are more ubiquitous 
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 The ‘push’ factors identified by Lorenzo et al. (2007:1412) include: “low [salaries] at home, no overtime or 
hazard pay, poor health insurance coverage; work overload or stressful working [environments], slow promotion, 
limited opportunities for employment [and] decreased health budget”. The ‘pull’ factors highlighted include: “higher 
income, better benefits and compensation packages [abroad]; lower nurse to patient ratios, more options in working 
hours, [and] chances to upgrade nursing skills” (Lorenzo et al., 2007:1412. Dimaya et al. (2012:3) identify a similar 
set of factors; they also note that an abundance of “job vacancies [abroad] due to local shortages” and a consequent 
greater ease finding gainful employment often entice them to emigrate. 
 
19
 This section draws on the work of Tsamis (2009). 
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than the success stories that seem the ‘exception to the norm’ (Lerner, 2009; Gaisford et al., 
2010).  
 
Greece is among the many countries whose cluster policies, initiatives and efforts have 
yielded outcomes that have fallen short of expectation. Cluster-based development initiatives in 
the Greek context have in recent years assumed the form, as they have in countless other 
contexts, of science and technology parks (e.g. Rodríguez-Pose and Hardy, 2014). Strategic 
actions in this direction represent concerted efforts to fabricate environments that support and 
facilitate the sort of interactions, collaborations and relationships that underpin knowledge-
intensive, innovative processes. The eventual dissemination of the ideas, knowledge and 
innovations that emerge from these processes to actors both within and outside of the park is 
anticipated to contribute to the upgrading of the innovative system as a whole and, in turn, foster 
local economic dynamism.  
 
Paradoxically, identifying and analysing cluster policy failures has proven difficult; 
Gaisford et al. (2010: 317) note that “researchers appear to have been more interested in pursuing 
insights from successful clusters rather than chronicling failures [and] communities with 
unsuccessful cluster are hardly likely to publicise the fact because of the damage it may do to 
their future development prospect.” Tsamis’ (2009) exploration of the evolution of two Greek 
science and technology parks – Thessaloniki Technology Park (TTP) and the Science and 
Technology Park of Crete (STEP-C) – and of the factors behind their limited success relative to 
expectations represents one of the few exceptions to this trend. 
  
The establishment of TTP and STEP-C were motivated by similar sets of objectives. Both 
parks sought to: promote the emergence and growth of innovative firms; foster entrepreneurship; 
facilitate the sharing, dissemination and transfer of knowledge, technology and innovation; and, 
above all else, catalyse local economic growth and development (Tsamis, 2009: 152).  
 
The environments in which the parks were constructed were not especially conducive or 
well-suited to innovative activity. Neither region displayed a significant, if any, measureable 
innovative capacity; levels of R&D expenditure in both contexts lagged well behind European 
 30 
averages as did their respective propensities to generate innovative output (Tsamis, 2009: 158-
159). Moreover, the public sector is, as it is in many of Europe’s less developed regions, 
overrepresented in what little innovative activities these regions host – the lion’s share if R&D 
investment in both Central Macedonia and Crete is undertaken by public sector actors. The 
respective economic fabrics of the two territories were relatively technologically-unsophisticated 
as well; Thessaloniki, and the broader Central Macedonia region within which it is situated, 
specialised in more traditional, less knowledge-intensive activities and sectors, while Crete 
suffered from a dearth of both high-technology manufacturing and knowledge intensive services 
(Tsamis, 2009: 157). These socioeconomic shortcomings were also compounded by a number of 
institutional deficiencies that distorted markets, discouraged investment in innovative activity, 
hampered entrepreneurship and deterred FDI (Tsamis, 2009: 166). 
 
 The two parks relied upon what may be considered fairly standard interventions and 
instruments to attract and, in turn, support firms and entrepreneurs. Occupants of the parks were 
provided with access to both basic and more technologically-oriented infrastructure (e.g. labs, 
testing facilities) and with a variety of business support services (e.g. accountancy and various 
consultancy services, technology transfer services) (Tsamis, 2009: 184, 190). Incubators 
designed to lend support to nascent, high potential firms were developed in and served as 
cornerstones of both TTP and STEP-C as well.  Interestingly, neither park elected to design or 
implement formalised networking programmes or services to promote inter- and intra-cluster 
linkages, connectivity or interaction (Tsamis, 2009: 230).  
 
 TTP nor STEP-C has, since their respective inceptions in the mid-1990s, fulfilled their 
primary objective and made a substantive contribution of regional economic growth or 
development; while STEP-C was perhaps marginally more successful than TTP,  the impact of 
the parks on their respective broader regional contexts is best described as “very weak” (Tsamis, 
2009: 230).  
 
The more direct contributions of the parks to local economic output and employment 
have been limited. In 2004, TTP accounted for less than 0.1% and 0.05% of Central Macedonia’s 
GDP and total employment, respectively (Tsamis, 2009: 223). STEP-C’s contributions were 
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larger, but still underwhelming: 0.45-0.5% of Crete’s regional GDP and 0.38% of total 
employment. The two parks interestingly accounted for significant shares of the total R&D 
expenditure undertaken in by their host regions: TTP hosted 9.7%, while STEP-C undertook 
35% of all R&D expenditure in their respective regions (Tsamis, 2009: 223). That the two parks 
undertook such significant amount of R&D but did not contribute in an equivalent manner to 
regional economic output is indicative of the pervasive difficulties park tenants faced when 
mobilising and applying knowledge. The parks were also characterised by an inability to attract 
foreign firms, investment or partnerships to their host regions (Tsamis, 2009: 224). 
 
The more indirect impacts of TTP and STEP-C on the innovative capacities and 
innovation systems of their respective regions have been negligible as well. Tsamis (2009: 230) 
notes that “the research activity [undertaken by the parks] remains disconnected from the local 
economy with no indication of a role in the development of high-tech clusters or collective 
learning processes”. Even more generally, there is little in the way of evidence to suggest that 
either park has contributed substantively to the reorientation of their host economies towards 
more technologically-sophisticated, innovative and, ultimately, higher-value added activities or 
sectors (Tsamis, 2009: 226).  
 
The performance of TTP and STEP-C were undoubtedly constrained by a number of 
factors. Their failure, however, to contribute to economic growth is a function primarily of two 
factors. The first is that the parks were “largely disconnected from the regional economy” 
(Tsamis. 2009: 227). That is, there was an insufficient degree of connectivity between the 
activities that were occurring in the parks and the economic actors and activities that existed and 
transpired beyond them. This stifled any potential diffusion of knowledge and innovation to local 
firms; precluded the establishment of forward and backward linkages and relationships; and, 
most generally, hampered the capacity of the park to contribute to the upgrading of the broader 
regional innovations systems of which they were theoretically a part. This first factor was 
compounded by a second, more fundamental one: the parks were established in innovation-
averse environments that were plagued by a host of deficiencies and, were consequently 
incapable of sustaining, let alone benefitting from, knowledge-intensive activity and innovation. 
While the parks were envisioned as means to address the challenges and limited economic 
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dynamism of the regions in which they were built, in the end, both TTP and STEP-C fell victim 
to and could not overcome the pronounced socioeconomic and institutional constraints imposed 
by their respective regions (Tsamis, 2009: 227, 230).  
 
What leads to strategies of waste? 
 
Although the five cases presented above represent very different examples in scope, 
dimension and orientation, a number of common features emerge when trying to explain why 
what, by all means, have been considerable development efforts not only failed to deliver on 
their stated goals, but also resulted in significant opportunity costs that have left many of the 
regions where the interventions took place in a similar, if not worse, condition than if no 
development strategy had been conducted. 
 
First and foremost is the unbalanced nature of most of the interventions. Each of the five 
aforementioned strategies leaned strongly on one development axis linked to a particular 
dominant theory. Whether it was transport infrastructure in the case of the European Union, 
special economic zones in Peru, skill training in the Philippines, or science parks in Greece, too 
much faith was put on the supply of one development factor as a trigger for future economic 
development. However, the neglect of other development axes and disregarding the interplay 
between different dimensions of development intervention represented in all cases a serious 
hurdle for the success of the strategy. 
 
Second, most of the strategies described above paid little attention to local conditions. 
The application of simple, theory-linked approaches often led to the belief that intervention could 
overcome what were often harsh realities on the ground. However, additional investment in 
R&D, new kilometres of motorways, or growth pole and cluster-type interventions in 
environments with serious shortcomings in basic endowments have yielded limited results. 
Excessive focus on the physical development of the zones overlooking sectoral structure, local 
infrastructure needs, and skills availability in Peru has condemned the zones to almost economic 
irrelevance. Neglect of local factors and, especially, of the socioeconomic and skill conditions 
that mediate the returns of R&D investment has stifled innovation in the less developed regions 
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of Europe, while a disdain of issues related to job availability and barriers to entry in the labour 
market have pushed Filipino nurses to migrate. However, the most glaring omission has been the 
limited attention paid to local institutional conditions. The promotion of new infrastructure, 
clusters, or growth poles in areas with poor quality of government, without parallel measures to 
improve government capacity, transparency and accountability, and/or reduce corruption, has 
suitably undermined the returns of intervention. If anything, the involvement of poor quality, 
often corrupt governments in decision-making processes has in some cases benefitted the private, 
short-term economic and political interests of certain local stakeholders at the expense of 
medium- and long-term economic returns. 
 
Development strategies that disproportionately relied on the potential advantages of one 
type of intervention and were largely disconnected from the reality of the territories where they 
operated have, as a consequence, frequently ended as strategies of waste, with little to show in 
terms of productivity increases, job generation, and economic development, despite considerable 
levels of investment. 
 
 
3.2. Strategies of gain 
 
The various cases presented in the previous section raise understandable concerns about 
the general effectiveness of the various types of development interventions that have been 
pursued with particular enthusiasm across the world and, in turn, about the sensibility of the 
continued pursuit of these strategies in developing and emerging environments. However, not all 
types of development intervention can be easily dismissed as strategies of waste. Soundly-
designed and well-executed multidimensional strategies – be they based on infrastructural 
expansion, investment attraction, the upgrading of innovative capacities and human capital 
endowments, or the promotion of co-location and positive territorial externalities – can also 
generate considerable economic returns, leading to strategies of gain. Strategies of gain can be 
defined as development approaches that have proven particularly capable of delivering on their 
expected impacts by fulfilling both their inherent potential and designated objectives. In this 
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section we will highlight a number of strategies of gain, summarising at the end of section the 
factors behind their success. 
 
Shoring up ‘infrastructure gaps’ in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia 
 
The pursuit of the infrastructure-oriented development strategies inspired by and 
grounded in neoclassical growth theories has, by no means, been confined to the European Union 
or the developed world more broadly.  A number of African and Asian nations have sought to 
develop their infrastructure endowments, often with a view to rectify basic endowment 
deficiencies and bottlenecks that serve as fundamental impediments to economic performance 
and ensure that a what is effectively a prerequisite for economic growth is fulfilled. 
 
 African nations, and Sub-Saharan ones in particular, have suffered – and still to a large 
extent suffer – from seriously debilitating infrastructure shortages, transportation or otherwise. 
Infrastructure shortages in the African context are viewed by many as fundamental – albeit not 
insurmountable – impediments to economic performance and dynamism; these deficiencies are 
thought to hamper inter- and intra-regional trade, discourage domestic and foreign investment, 
slow or prevent territorial cohesion, contribute to the retrenchment of regional disparities and, 
from a more socioeconomic perspective, obstruct access to basic public services thereby 
compromising efforts to reduce and eradicate poverty (Calderon and Servén, 2008; Foster and 
Briceño-Garmendia, 2010; Mbekeani, 2010; Hartzenberg, 2011, Gutman et al., 2015).  
Therefore, infrastructure investment and development and the filling of the so-called Sub-
Saharan ‘infrastructure-gap’ have been prioritised by governments and international 
organisations alike. The financial commitments made by the World Bank, the African 
Development Bank and the OECD Development Assistance Committee to infrastructure 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa have, for example, increased steadily since 2000 ultimately 
reaching US$10bn in 2012 (Gutman et al., 2015: 24). At the national level, a number of Sub-
Saharan countries are directing significant and often increasing amounts of resources to 
infrastructure development; in 2013, Uganda, South Africa and Botswana were among the 
African countries that channelled more than seven percent of their respective GDPs towards 
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infrastructure (ICA, 2014: 46). The question that must be addressed, once again, is whether this 
expenditure has provided a measurable boost to economic dynamism.  
 
Taken together, the body of empirical literature that assesses the returns to infrastructure 
investment and development in Sub-Saharan Africa suggests that transportation infrastructure 
investment has had a considerable growth-boosting effect.  Calderón and Servén (2008), for one, 
examine the link between infrastructure development and economic growth and inequality in 
Sub-Saharan Africa between 1960 and 2005. Relying on indices that capture both the quantity 
and the quality of the infrastructure with which a country is endowed, the study provides “robust 
evidence that infrastructure development has had a positive impact on long-run growth and a 
negative impact on income inequality” in Sub-Saharan Africa (p. 29). Kodongo and Ojah (2016) 
reach a similar conclusion about returns specifically to infrastructure spending in the Sub-
Saharan context. The econometric analysis reveals a positive and statistically significant 
association between infrastructure expenditure and economic growth and, moreover, provides an 
indication that relatively less-developed Sub-Saharan African countries can expect to reap 
greater returns from infrastructure investment than their more developed Sub-Saharan 
counterparts. This latter finding implies that infrastructure investment, even in the Sub-Saharan 
African context, is subject to diminishing returns. These results are corroborated by country-level 
studies. Kumo (2012), Bosede et al. (2013) and Chingoiro and Mbulawa (2016) probe the link 
between infrastructure expenditure and economic performance in South Africa, Nigeria and 
Kenya, respectively. In each case, the authors unearth evidence to suggest that investment in 
infrastructure has been an important driver of economic growth. 
 
In short, the pursuit of infrastructure-oriented policies and strategies and the prioritisation 
of investment in infrastructure development, more generally, in the Sub-Saharan African context 
have been justified by the returns they have generated and the growth they have brought about. 
The preeminent explanation for why the returns to these investments have been so substantial 
relates to the fact that infrastructural endowments in Sub-Saharan Africa have long fallen – and 
still today fall – below some base-level that is necessary to sustain and support economic activity 
and dynamism; that is, much of Sub-Saharan Africa is situated farther away from the 
‘infrastructure frontier’. Expenditure on infrastructure expansion in environments where this is 
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the case is, because of their distance to this frontier, less likely to suffer the sorts of diminishing 
returns that were especially evident in the European context. This implies that as long as 
infrastructural deficiencies exist, well-targeted and well-executed investments in the expansion 
and upgrading of infrastructure will continue to generate economic growth. 
 
The realisation of returns from infrastructure development projects should not, however, 
be viewed as inevitable, even in environments characterised by the most severe infrastructural 
deficiencies. Botswana’s Trans-Kgalagadi Road Project serves, in that respect, as something of a 
cautionary tale that underscores the importance of strategic planning, thorough diagnoses of local 




The overarching aims of the Trans-Kgalagadi Road Project were to “reduce transport 
costs, enhance social and economic integration of South-Western Part of Botswana and facilitate 
economic integration with Namibia” (African Development Bank, 2011:7). The project centred 
on the construction of a 221km of bitumen ‘highway’ to replace what was previously an unpaved 
stretch of road between Sekoma and the Namibia-Botswana border crossing at Mamuno. 
Construction of the highway was completed and the road opened in 1998. With time, however, it 
became clear that the road was underutilized and that traffic volumes were well below those 
envisioned in the early stages of the project. Concern that the highway “could potentially 
develop into a ‘white elephant’” (African Development Bank, 2011: 18) inspired authorities to 
undertake a comprehensive review of the project in hopes of developing some understanding of 
why the anticipated outcomes of the project had not yet materialised.  The review revealed that 
the underutilisation was attributable, at least in part, to “non-physical barriers to the cross-border 
movement of people and goods” (African Development Bank, 2011: 19), none of which were 
considered or factored in to the planning process. That is, even though the road was designed as 
a facilitator of economic integration between Namibia and Botswana, authorities failed to 
recognise that the cross-border movement of people and goods was inhibited as much by 
institutional barriers – including, for example, customs or unnecessarily complex transit 
procedures – as it was by the previous lack of physical connectivity. As a result, the project did 
                                                 
20
 The proceeding discussion is based on a Project Performance Evaluation Report (PPER) prepared by the African 
Development Bank for the AfDB-funded Trans-Kgalagadi Road Project (African Development Bank, 2011). 
 37 
not include measures or initiatives to increase the ease with which goods and people could cross 
the border between Botswana and Namibia – a shortcoming that would prove particularly 
consequential for the economic impact of the highway. It was only after a series of 
complementary investments were made and initiatives undertaken (including both physical 
measures such as the establishment of  trade-facilitating ‘one-stop border posts’ and less tangible 
ones, including institutional reforms and the establishment of bodies – the Trans-Kalahari 
Corridor Management Committee – to oversee and manage the corridor) to transform the 
highway into a “transit corridor” that the project began to impel and increase interregional 
cooperation and integration, promote trade, and yield broader development outcomes (African 
Development Bank, 2011:19-21).   
 
Infrastructure-oriented development approaches have found success in a diversity of 
Asian contexts as well. Deficiencies in infrastructure were, as in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, 
ubiquitous across many less developed Asian regions. The Rural Transport Improvement 
Project
21
 and Central Yunnan Roads Development Project
22
 pursued in Bangladesh and China, 
respectively serve not only to confirm that targeted infrastructural investments that address very 
specific deficiencies or bottlenecks can contribute to both economic growth and socioeconomic 
development in less developed contexts but also as ‘best practices’ from which lessons can 
undoubtedly be drawn. 
 
Bangladesh’s rural areas have traditionally been plagued by a host of infrastructural 
deficiencies. While the implications of these shortages are numerous, one stands out as 
especially consequential: infrastructure shortages or inadequacies can compromise the capacity 
of impoverished people living in these rural areas to access and engage in income generating 
activities. Recognising this, the Government of Bangladesh embarked on a World Bank-
supported initiative – the Rural Transport Improvement Project (RTIP) – whose principal 
socioeconomic objective was to support poverty alleviation and foster economic growth in rural 
                                                 
21
 The proceeding discussion is based on a Project Performance Assessment Report prepared by the World Bank 
Group’s Independent Evaluation Group (World Bank, 2016c). 
 
22
 The proceeding discussion is based on a Validation Report prepared by the Asian Development Bank’s 
Independent Evaluation Department (Asian Development Bank, 2016). 
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areas via the provision of improved access to social services and economic opportunity in the 
county’s rural communities (World Bank, 2016c: 2). 
 
The project was implemented and overseen by the government’s Local Government 
Engineering Department and featured eight complementary components that operated across and 
addressed multiple development axes. The first six were of a more physical nature. They related 
primarily to the maintenance and upgrading of rural roads, bridges and culverts, rural markets 
and river jetties; to the acquisition of land needed for this construction; and to the 
implementation of resettlement and other land/environmental management plans. The final two 
components centred on the provision of technical assistance and consultancy services, capacity 
building, human capital upgrading, and institutional development. 
 
The prioritisation of institutional development in this particular project was due to two 
factors. First, the project’s primary socioeconomic objective was accompanied by a second, more 
institutionally-oriented goal: “to enhance the capacity of relevant government institutions to 
better manage rural transport infrastructure” (World Bank, 2016c: 2). Second, projects like these 
can be derailed by various capacity constraints and other institutional deficiencies. The shoring 
up of capacities and capabilities is therefore often necessary to facilitate the efficient execution 
and longer-term sustainability of policy initiatives. 
 
While the project was not executed without its share of challenges,
23
 at closure in 2012, 
the project had successfully constructed, rehabilitated or upgraded 1638km of ‘upazila’ roads 
(feeder roads); 15,965 meters of missing bridges/culverts; 123 rural markets and 32 river jetties 
(World Bank, 2016c: 7). More importantly, however, there is ample evidence to suggest that the 
project had profoundly positive economic and social impacts. Average monthly income and 
expenditure, for example increased in project areas by 73.4% (compared to 14.9% in non-project 
areas) and 55.8% (33.9% in non-project areas) (World Bank, 2016c: 8). The improvements to the 
infrastructure networks and the increased connectivity they facilitated have also been linked to 
                                                 
23
 The most notable among them were, first, that the earliest stages of project were plagued by minor delays 
attributable to “challenges associated with land acquisition and compensation and poor contract management” 
(World Bank, 2016c:4); and, second, that “the capacity building objective only partially achieved its training 
objectives” (World Bank, 2016c:1). 
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increases in agricultural and non-agricultural production and trade, though ex-post evaluation has 
not yet been able to determine the extent to which increases in the latter are directly attributable 
to the project (World Bank, 2016c: 8).  
 
There are also indications that the intervention has delivered more socioeconomically-
related benefits to rural residents in project areas in the form of improved access to both 
education and healthcare. Total school enrolment and the total number of healthcare services 
recipients increased by 12.2% and 32% respectively in project areas (World Bank, 2016c: 9). 
These increases materialised in the face of decreases of 60% and 20%, respectively, in non-
project areas (World Bank, 2016c: 9). 
 
Yunnan province in Southwestern China is among the country’s least economically 
developed regions. A lack of accessibility and infrastructural deficits are thought to be two of the 
factors to which this underdevelopment and the ineffectiveness of previous poverty alleviation 
and developments efforts are most readily attributable (Asian Development Bank, 2016: 2). The 
upgrading of intra- and interregional transportation infrastructure has therefore come to be seen 
as a prerequisite for the achievement of economic growth and development and the eradication 
of interregional inequality. 
  
 It was this perception that led to the formulation and implementation of the Asian 
Development Bank-supported Central Yunnan Roads Project. The overarching aim of the project 
was to establish “a well-functioning integrated road transport system in Yunnan Province and 
[connect] the rest of the Greater Mekong Subregion” (Asian Development Bank, 2016: 2) with 
the aim of helping to catalyse economic growth and contribute to poverty alleviation in Yunnan. 
Achieving higher levels of trade between Yunnan and the remainder of the country and, 





Figure 3 - Central Yunnan Roads Project area; Author’s elaboration 
 
The project was guided by four specific, mutually-reinforcing objectives each of which 
pertained to a differing aspect of the region’s infrastructure system: (1) the construction of a 
Wuding-Kunming expressway; (2) the upgrading of 190km of local roads; (3) the improvement 
of road and traffic safety; and (4) the development of technical capacities of parties responsible 
for the design and implementation of the project (Asian Development Bank, 2016: 3). 
 
It was operationalised at the subnational level by two implementing agencies each of 
which were responsible for two of the aforementioned objectives. The Yunnan Provincial 
Department of Transport oversaw road upgrading and safety improvement efforts. The Wukun 
Expressway Company Limited was tasked with the construction of the highway and the 
execution of the capacity building and institutional development initiatives. 
 
The targets associated with the project’s four guiding objectives were all achieved: (1) 
the 63.6km Wuding-Kunming expressway opened in October of 2013; (2) 190km of local roads 
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were rehabilitated over the course of the project; (3) efforts to improve road safety resulted in a 
decrease in road accident fatalities per 10,000 vehicles of 30% in 2013; and, finally, (4) staff of 
both the Yunnan Provincial Department of Transport and the Wukun Expressway Company 
Limited were provided with 63 person-months of international training (Asian Development 
Bank, 2016: 7).  
 
Upon review, it became clear that considerable progress had also been made towards the 
project’s underlying objective.
 24
 Ex-post assessment confirmed that the project made substantial 
contributions to both poverty reduction and economic development in Fumin County, Kunming 
City, Wuding County and Chuxiong Prefecture, all of which fell within the project area (Figure 
4). GDP per capita in the project area increased, for example, by an average of 18.3% between 
2008 and 2013. The per capita incomes of farmers in Fumin County (128%), Wuding County 
(122%) and Chuxiong Prefecture (104%) also increased between 2008 as did the disposable 
incomes of individuals living Kunming City (96%). The project, and the construction of the 
expressway in particular, also resulted in the creation of 3930 temporary jobs for local 
inhabitants as well as 268 permanent jobs. Finally, the project contributed to poverty alleviation 
in the project area; between 2011 and 2013, the number of ‘poor people’ living the project area 
decreased by close to 40%, from 204,800 to 124,300. 
 





Peru’s engagement with its special economic zones explored in the previous section is 
undoubtedly a cautionary tale. Special economic zone programmes have not, however, been 
universally ineffective; experiences like that of the Dominican Republic with special economic 
zones provide some indication that inward investment-oriented approaches can, under the right 
circumstances and if appropriately operationalised and overseen attract and concentrate 
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 The proceeding discussion is based on a World Bank (2016b) review of the Dominican Republic’ experience with 
special economic zones. 
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economic actors, activity and investment and, with time, evolve into ‘growth poles’, whose 
success and dynamism pays dividends in the form of regional economic development. 
 
Special economic zones have, in the Dominican context, proven to be “powerful 
[engines] for job generation, exports and productive diversification” (World Bank, 2016b: 8), 
means to attract foreign investment and effective instruments for the pursuit and achievement of 
economic growth.
26
 The country’s special economic zones, the first of which was established in 
1969, focused initially on textiles and clothing manufacturing, benefitting from the Multi-Fibre 
Agreement and the import quotas with which it was associated (World Bank, 2016b: 7). The end 
of Multi-Fibre Agreement in 2005, while a challenge for the country’s zones, also served as the 
impetus for a shift that saw the Dominican Republic’s special economic zones become 
increasingly engaged in more capital-intensive, higher-value added activities in the services, 
textiles, medical instruments, tobacco and agroindustry sectors (World Bank, 2016b: 8).  As of 
2014, the country’s zones, which rely on a mix of incentives in the form, primarily, of tariff 
exemptions and a range of fiscal instruments to attract firms and encourage investment, hosted, 
on average, 11 firms and accounted for 140,000 jobs (World Bank, 2016b: 8). By 2015, 65 
special economic zones had been established, 47 of which were privately owned and operated 
(World Bank, 2016b: 9). These zones, irrespective of whether they are privately or publically 
managed, are very much ‘outward-oriented’, prioritising both the attraction of foreign direct 
investment as well export promotion and the cultivation of domestic exporters (World Bank, 
2016b: 9). 
                                                 
26
 The Dominican Republic’s experience with special economic zones, while generally regarded as positive, has not 
been free of challenges and obstacles. There are concerns, for example, that the potential of these zones as sources 
of permanent employment creation may be waning as the firms they host become increasingly engaged in more 
technologically-sophisticated and higher-value added but also less labour intense activities and industries (World 
Bank 2016b: 13-14). Movements, like these, ‘up the value chain’ are indicative of a maturation of the zone 
programme and of the Dominican economy more generally. They also, however, are associated with “important 
labour implications” that policy makers must recognise and take steps to address and manage (World Bank, 2016b; 
13).  A second, and perhaps more immediate set of concerns, relates to the emergence of “a duality in [the country’s] 
production structure” and the performance and viability of non-SEZ firms more generally (World Bank 2016b: 10). 
That is, the country’s SEZ firms tend to be engaged in sectors and industries that are wholly and increasingly 
different to those within which their non-SEZ counterparts are participating and are, as result becoming increasingly 
disconnected from them (World Bank 2016b: 10). SEZ firms are, for example, still largely dependent on imported 
inputs (World Bank, 2016b: 18-19). Simply stated, non-SEZ firms are struggling to cultivate relationships with, 
benefit from and keep pace with the SEZ firms. This inevitably raises questions about the extent to which zones in 
the Dominican Republic can become a catalyst for more geographically widespread economic growth and 
development (World Bank 2016b). This, however, has not gone unnoticed by policy-makers who have since 
operationalised programmes designed to rectify it (see Footnote 26). 
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The success of the Dominican Republic’s zones is attributable to four key factors. First is 
the Dominican Republic’s relationship with the United States.  The country’s physical proximity 
to the United States coupled, first, with the Multi-Fibre Agreement and, later, with the 
Dominican Republic Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) – both of which 
granted preferential market access to Dominican exports –increased the appeal of the Dominican 
Republic’s special economic zones to foreign firms as sites for their offshore production 
activities.  
 
Second, the private sector has featured prominently in the country’s special economic 
zone regime. Not only are the vast majority of the country’s zones owned by private bodies that 
can leverage capabilities, capacities and experience that likely exceed those of their public-sector 
counterparts to manage and operate the zones in a more efficient manner, the private sector is 
also a contributor to the policy dialogue, via an “association of SEZ entrepreneurs 
(ADOZONA)” and representation on the committee that is responsible for the oversight and 
regulation of the country’s special economic zones (World Bank, 2016b: 9). It is, as a 
consequence, immediately engaged in the development of the country’s special economic zones 
programme. Such engagement is anticipated to ensure that the policies and initiatives linked to 
the programme are, and continue to be, sufficiently attuned to the needs and priorities of the 
stakeholders they target.  
 
Third, the country’s special economic zone programme is overseen by a single and 
effective regulatory body – the Consejo Nacional de Zonas Francas Especiales (CNZFE). Simple 
and streamlined regulatory systems are thought to impose lower transactions and administrative 
costs on firms and create a context that is more conducive to investment and economic activity; 
the assignment of oversight responsibilities to a single actor, as was the case is the Dominican 
Republic, eliminates coordination challenges and simplifies and streamlines its special economic 
zone regulatory regime. The CNZFE also assumes responsibility for efforts and initiatives to 
attract foreign firms and investment, effectively doubling as an inward investment agency. It has 
in recent years, “established a Statistical Department, an Economic Analysis and 
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Competitiveness division and a Promotion department” all of which have contributed to its 
success, “attracting investors from a number of emerging industries” (World Bank, 2016b: 9). 
 
Fourth the Dominican Republic’s special economic zones programme has been actively 
and efficiently governed by policy-makers that have managed to navigate a series of profound 
changes and challenges via the reformation of domestic regulations and policies (World Bank, 
2016b:9). That is, policy-makers have continually introduced changes to special economic zones 
legislation to ensure not only that the country’s special economic zones are compliant with WTO 
rules, but also that the zones remain as attractive and competitive as possible and can, in turn, 
continue to serve as catalysts for export and economic growth (World Bank, 2016b: 22).  
 
Relatedly, policy-makers have also recently acknowledged and taken steps to rectify a 
pronounced weakness to which the zone programme is subject: namely that the zones are 
increasingly detached from the remainder of the economy. Recognising that greater connectivity 
between the zones and the territories in which they are situated must be fostered if the zones are 
to contribute to more geographically widespread, inclusive socioeconomic development, they 
have pursed initiatives to promote greater interaction between firms situated inside the country’s 
zones and those that are not. Most notably, they have established a ‘match-making programme’
27
 
that attempts to promote the establishment of inter-firm linkages (World Bank, 2016b: 21). 
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 ‘Match-making’ efforts thus far have involved the facilitation of “business-to-business meetings”. The ultimate 
aim of these meetings are to expose SEZ firms to local, non-SEZ firms (and vice-versa) and, ideally, lay the 
foundation for the establishment of a more formal, mutually beneficial relationships between them (World Bank, 
2016b: 21). In 2015, for example, the CNZFE piloted a “match making round in which more than 60 business to 
business meetings took place” (World Bank, 2016b: 21). It was the intention of the CNZFE to, in subsequent 
iterations, expand and open participation in these ‘rounds’ to a variety of other actors, stakeholders and institutions, 
including “national associations of exporters, representatives of chambers of commerce, and other industry 
representatives” (paraphrasing World Bank, 2016b: 21). It should also be noted that these concerted match-making 
efforts are supplemented by the provision of training to domestic firms – again by the CNZFE – to ensure, that local 
suppliers are aware of the “quality certifications needed to become suppliers of SEZ firms” and, importantly, in a 
position to meet, if not exceed them (World Bank, 2016b: 21).  
    
28
 The proceeding discussion is based on a Performance Evaluation Report for Vietnam’s Vocational and Technical 
Education Project prepared by the Asian Development Bank (2013). 
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The stock of suitably skilled human capital with which a region is endowed does, as 
postulated by the endogenous growth theories, influence its economic performance, and, 
consequently, actions geared towards its expansion could contribute to the achievement of 
economic growth.  If not mobilised and engaged in productivity activity, however, skilled 
individuals are rendered unable to contribute to economic growth and development. It is for this 
reason that education and training-oriented initiatives must, as they were in the Vietnamese 
Vocational and Technical Education Project, be aligned with the needs of firms and the demands 
of the labour market more generally. Training schemes, moreover, should ideally be integrated 
into broader development strategies that balance supply-side efforts with actions that address 
demand-side conditions.  
 
Shortages of skilled labour have long been identified as a preeminent development 
challenge for Vietnam. In 1998, for example, “about 80% of the labour force was unskilled…and 
only 10% had formal training” (Asian Development Bank, 2013: 4).  This shortage of skills was 
mostly attributable to a weak supply-side-oriented vocational and technical education system that 
was neither robust enough to cope with the country’s increasingly large and expanding labour 
force nor capable of catering to and fulfilling the shifting needs of the country’s labour market 
and industries (Asian Development Bank, 2013: 4). Reformation of this system was therefore 
seen as means to, overcome the pronounced skills deficit facing the country. The Asian 
Development Bank-supported Vocational and Technical Education Project represented an effort 
to do just that.  
 
The project was motivated in equal measure by an awareness of the various inadequacies 
of the country’s vocational and technical education system and by the more general perception 
that the provision of training and the expansion of the county’s skilled labour pools were crucial 
to achieving both of the aims of Vietnam’s market-oriented industrialisation policy (Asian 
Development Bank, 2013: 1) and of economic growth and development, more broadly (Asian 
Development Bank, 2013: 11). Overseen by the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs 
and implemented by the governments’ General Department of Vocational Training, the project 
was guided by three specific objectives (Asian Development Bank, 2013: 1): (1) improving the 
market-orientation of the country’s vocational and technical education system; (2) improving the 
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efficiency of the vocational and technical education programmes offered by ‘key schools’; and 
(3) strengthening the institutional capacity of the General Department of Vocational Training to 
facilitate both the implementation of the project and provide the government with the capacity to 
undertake future reforms. 
 
The project featured three discrete but inevitably interrelated components, each of which 
corresponded to the one of its three main objectives. The first component was composed of 
efforts and initiatives to increase the market-orientation of the vocational and technical education 
system and increase its coherence with the skills requirements and priorities of employers. These 
included the development of a ‘labour market information system’ and other enterprise surveys 
to facilitate the “systematic assessment of the demands of enterprises and employers” (Asian 
Development Bank, 2013: 6); efforts to increase the ‘career guidance’ available for students; and 
the development of new curriculums, and corresponding teaching guides and learning materials, 
that were more closely aligned with the “skills requirements of employers” (Asian Development 
Bank, 2013: 6). The second component centred on the construction and renovation of, the 
installation of new equipment and technologies in and overall upgrading of 15 key schools that 
were the focus of the project (Asian Development Bank, 2013: 7). The third and final capacity-
building component featured initiatives to establish unified qualification and assessment systems 
and frameworks for monitoring and certification purposes; increase the accessibility of 
vocational and technical education to women, minorities and other disadvantaged groups; and 
provide training to and improve the technical capacity of both teachers and policy-makers at all 
levels of government. 
 
The more immediate outcomes of the project have been numerous. With regards to its 
first objective, the project resulted in the design and implementation of 48 new curricula and in 
the establishment of a more market-oriented, bottom-up, stakeholder-driven process to devise 
curricula that reflect labour market demands and the skills requirements of employers (Asian 
Development Bank, 2013: 18). The second objective was fulfilled by upgrading the facilities and 
equipment at the 15 key schools to the benefit of both students and the schools themselves 
(Asian Development Bank, 2013: 18). From the perspective of students, the upgrading of the 
schools, equipment and resources improved the overall learning experience and afforded students 
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the opportunity to become familiar with the technologies, tools and equipment relied on by 
employers and enterprises. The reputations of the 15 target schools were enhanced by the 
upgrading processes as well, which, in turn, increased their capacity of these schools to attract 
and train more students. Some progress has also been made towards the achievement of the third, 
institutionally oriented objective, though this is the front on which work remains. Curricula 
development training was, for example, provided to 4900 teachers and administrators. The 
success of the project on other fronts also implies that any capacity building initiatives 
undertaken with a view to facilitate project execution were at least somewhat effective. The 
establishment of accreditation, certification and qualification frameworks and systems is, 
however, not complete, and, similarly, efforts to increase the participation of women, minorities 
and other disadvantaged groups have not been as successful as envisioned (Asian Development 
Bank, 2013: 20). 
 
The project’s broader labour-market impacts have been sizeable as well. The project 
expanded the country’s stock of skilled and vocationally trained labour. Between 2001 and 2007 
the 15 key schools targeted by the project graduated 210,600 people, many of whom participated 
in and benefitted directly from one of the newly devised, market-tailored curricula (Asian 
Development Bank, 2013: 27). Similarly, the majority of graduates from the project’s target 
schools’ encountered little difficulty obtaining employment. A follow-up assessment revealed 
that only 4.1-6.2 percent of graduates were unemployed two to three years after the completion 
of training (Asian Development Bank, 2013: 28).  Graduates also tended to earn higher and 
faster rising incomes than non-graduates (Asian Development Bank, 2013: 29).  
 
The most significant labour-market impact of the project however may also be its least 
quantifiable. The ex post performance review indicates that the project “helped to orient [the 
overarching] vocational and technical education system toward a market-driven approach” 
(Asian Development Bank, 2013: 27). That is to say, the project has had a profound effect on 
attitudes toward and policy-thinking about the way in which vocational and technical education 
systems should be structured, and, relatedly, about the necessity of adopting market-oriented 
approaches that integrate demand-side factors and concerns into supply-side policies and 
initiatives.  Overall, it has impelled a shift away from the supply-driven policies of the past 
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towards more flexible and sustainable integrated, demand-driven policies that are likely to yield 
benefits for employees and employers alike.  
 




Cluster-oriented development policies have, as alluded to in the previous section, 
encountered their share of difficulties and challenges. Far too often, policy-makers have sought 
foster the co-location of firms and economic actors in economically disadvantaged regions 
without sufficient concern for the capacity of those regions to in the first instance, sustain and, in 
turn, benefit from the clusters they were attempting to cultivate. Limited attention has also been 
paid to the promotion of linkages and connections between the cluster itself and the territory and 
economic system in which it was situated or to the encouragement of interactions, cooperation 
and collaborations within the cluster. The neglect of these considerations explains many of the 
less-successful clusters policies pursued in a diversity of contexts. Brazil’s Arranjos Productivos 
Locais (APL) policy, however, serves as a reminder that carefully designed, contextually-tailored 
cluster-based development strategies can have a profound positive impact on the economic 
fortunes of the places in which they are pursued.  
 
Quantitative impact analysis of cluster development policies, in the emerging world in 
particular, are few and far between (Garone et al., 2015). This absence of evidence, ultimately, 
inhibits our capacity to form robust conclusions about the more tangible outcomes of and overall 
effectiveness of cluster-based development strategies.  Garone et al. (2015) address this barrier 
by exploring the employment generation, value creation and export-propensity outcomes 
associated with the implementation of the Brazil’s APL policies in a selection of country’s 
clusters, providing, in their own words, “the first rigorous impact evaluation of a cluster 
development policy in Latin America” (Garone et al., 2015: 926). They define the APLs as 
“clusters of firms within the same administrative area (e.g. municipalities) that share a particular 
economic specialisation” (Garone et al., 2015: 929). Operation in close physical and sectoral 
proximity is not, however, the main characteristic of these clusters; Garone et al. (2015: 929) are 
                                                 
29
 This section draws on Garone et al.’s (2015) econometric investigation into the effectiveness of Brazil’s APL 
policies in two of its provinces. 
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careful to stress that it is the interaction, collaboration and cooperation among the cluster’s 
various inhabitants and stakeholders that set these APLs apart from mere agglomerations of 
economic actors and activity.  
 
Prior to 2004, APLs were established and supported by various, unconnected public and 
private SME-promotion agencies. In 2004, however, recognising the inherent potential of these 
APLs as tools for the promotion of local economic development, Brazil introduced an official 
APL policy, whose overarching aim was to support job creation and bolster the competiveness of 
firms and the regions they occupy via interventions designed to increase efficiency of, and 
interaction and cooperation between co-located firms (Garone et al., 2015: 929). APL policy, 
which is now manged and overseen by a purpose built ‘APL Permanent Working Group’ within 
the Federal Government’s Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade,
30
   has since 
become a prominent feature of the country’s industrial policy.  
 
 APL interventions have not been pursued indiscriminately. Authorities, rely on a rigorous 
assessment process to determine if and where policy efforts will be implemented (Garone et al., 
2015: 929). The primary reason for doing so is to ensure that scarce resources are channelled to 
support clusters that, on the one hand, are sufficiently developed to actually benefit from the 
policy but, on the other hand, still face challenges and obstacles that hamper their performance 
and warrant policy intervention. Interventions are therefore, in effect, targeted, at clusters 
characterised simultaneously by “certain levels of SME concentration and specialisation (often 
defined as existing or potential APL)” (Garone et al., 2015: 929) and “credible development 
potential” (Garone et al., 2015: 930). The extent to which a particular cluster could contribute to 
processes of local economic development is also integrated into the selection process (Garone et 
al., 2015: 931). The implication of the employment of a rigorous selection process and criteria is 
that APL policy interventions are not guided by the objective of physically creating clusters, but 
rather by the aim of transforming a group of co-located firms into a ‘prototypical’ cluster in 
which interaction, cooperation and collaboration are ubiquitous (Garone et al., 2015: 930).  
 
                                                 
30
 While the APL Permanent Working Group is responsible for the oversight and coordination of APL policies, the 
interventions themselves are implemented at the local level often by the Brazilian Service to Support Micro and 
Small Enterprises (SEBRAE) (Garone et al., 2015).  
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 Brazil’s APL policy interventions are composed of two distinct stages. The first stage 
centres on the development of ‘strategic development plan’, informed by both comprehensive 
diagnostic analyses and by the participation and insights of private- and public-sector 
stakeholders. It is also at this stage that institutional strengthening and capacity building-type 
activities are undertaken. This first planning stage, and APL interventions more generally, are 
bottom-up and participatory in nature; Garone et al. (2015: 929) highlight that the key foci in the 
policy elaboration phase include the fostering of cooperation within the APL; the promotion of 
interactions between the main agents in the cluster; and the identification of the local leaders 
who will be responsible for the implementation of policy interventions.  
 
The second stage of policy intervention process consists of the actual operationalisation 
of the development plan and the implementation of the specific actions envisioned by it. The 
exact set of tools and instruments relied on by different APLs will vary in accordance with their 
respective development plans and the opportunities and challenges by which a particular cluster 
is characterised. That said, interventions, irrespective of where they are pursued, tend not to 
target individual firms, but rather, focus on cluster-level actions and on the promotion intra-
cluster networks and cooperation and interaction (Garone et al., 2015: 929-930). 
 
APL interventions have been pursed across Brazil and have targeted agglomerations that 
specialise in any number of industries. Garone et al. (2015), however, focus their empirical 
analysis on a handful of APL policies implemented by the Brazilian Service to Support Micro 
and Small Enterprises (SEBRAE) in São Paulo and Minas Gerais to devise insights into the 
overall effectiveness of Brazil’s APL policy programme. 
 
The picture that emerges from this econometric exercise is a favourable one. The study 
provides evidence to suggest that the APL policy interventions pursued in the states of interest 
contributed to job creation, value generation and increased export propensity in the clusters in 
which they were pursued (Garone et al., 2015: 936). Moreover, these more-specific employment- 
and export-related outcomes are interpreted as evidence that APL policies, and the interventions 
of which they are composed, have augmented the overall productivity of the firms that compose 
clusters targeted by these strategic interventions. The authors assert that “the simultaneous 
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effects of employment and export measures [would] hardly be achievable without a significant 
increase in firms’ productivity” and, consequently, that “the efficiency enhancing activities put in 
place by the APL policy…were actually effective” (Garone et al., 2015: 936). The analysis also 
indicates that even firms that were not explicitly targeted by the APL interventions themselves 
but were physically proximate to those that were benefitted over the medium-to-long term from 
spillovers (Garone et al., 2015: 336). The inference to be drawn here is that APL policies have 
contributed to more than just efficiency and productivity gains for targeted firms. They have 
served as instruments for the pursuit of more widespread local economic development (Garone et 
al., 2015: 942). 
 
Putting together strategies of gain 
 
What are the main differences behind generating strategies of gain and strategies of 
waste? There is always a fine line that determines whether any type of development intervention 
becomes a strategy of gain or a strategy of waste. As the examples addressing infrastructure gaps 
in sub-Saharan Africa and in Bangladesh and Yunnan, China, the special economic zones in the 
Dominican Republic, the Vietnam vocational training schemes, and the Brazilian APL clusters 
have shown, making a development strategy work is a matter of nuance, depending often on 
involving a series of basic principles in the design of the adopted approach. 
 
The first principle in all cases has been the need to pay attention to local conditions, 
regardless of the theory and main area of innovation that informs the strategy. Awareness of the 
local context was paramount in the success of the special economic zones in the Dominican 
Republic and played a key role in the dynamism of Brazilian APL clusters. The Dominican 
government went the extra mile to link the economic activity generated inside the zones to the 
rest of the Dominican economy. In Vietnam – and in contrast to countless other human 
development and skill building strategies in the emerging world – vocational training was 
carefully aligned with the needs of local firms. It is this attention to context and, in no mean 
measure, the demand-driven nature of most of these initiatives that, first, contributed to a careful 
design of the strategy, based on a solid diagnosis of local conditions, bottlenecks and potential 
and which helped translate it into sustainable economic activity. 
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Awareness of local context has been accompanied by the skilful integration of 
interventions within broader development strategies. Road building projects in Bangladesh 
fulfilled their goals because there were complemented by the provision of technical assistance 
and consultancy services, together with capacity building schemes and measures aimed at 
improving local institutional conditions and human resource endowments. The Vietnam 
vocational training scheme was also integrated within a broader development strategy. 
 
Finally, sheer distance to so-called ‘frontiers’ may have helped in the success of certain 
schemes. Infrastructure endowments in sub-Saharan Africa, as is the case in Bangladesh and 
Yunnan province, are still sufficiently low to incur in diminishing returns, meaning that any 
additional investment in infrastructure is unlikely to suffer from high opportunity costs and can 
still contribute to set the preconditions for future economic development. 
 
 
4. Separating strategies of gain from those of waste 
 
 Taken together, the cases presented in the preceding section provide an indication of the 
potential of spatially and territorially-targeted development interventions as means to impel 
sustainable and locally-embedded economic growth and development. They also, however, serve 
as reminders, in the first instance, that the pursuit of these approaches can be fraught with 
challenges and may be prone to derailment by any number of factors or weaknesses, and, 
moreover, that great care, contextual awareness and a cognisance of the pitfalls to which these 
strategies often fall victim must be employed in both their design and implementation. The 
question that must therefore be addressed is, quite simply: what separates the strategies of gain 
from those of waste? The proceeding sections propose and address four points of divergence 
between the two aforementioned types of approaches. It is from these differences that a series of 
policy implications are gleaned. 
 
4.1. The importance of multidimensionality, integration and balance 
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 Each of the strategies of waste considered was guided by a different overarching 
objective ranging from, inter alia, the expansion of regional infrastructure endowments, to the 
attraction of non-local investment and enterprises to the co-location of economic activity and the 
productivity-enhancing externalities with which it is associated. Such interventions were clearly 
embedded in the extant theoretical approaches to growth and development, but generally fished 
in one particular theoretical pond, ignoring the benefits of alternative approaches. Each 
development intervention was therefore informed and underpinned by a single, different 
theoretical perspective and, as a result, was ‘unidimensional’ in nature. Hence, all of the 
strategies of waste presented shared one especially prominent commonality: they exclusively 
focused on one ‘development axis’. That is, each intervention concentrated excessively on the 
rectification of one particular deficiency through one type of policy instrument or intervention. 
As a consequence, they neglected the way and extent to which other, not-immediately-related 
factors affect and can actually compromise the overall efficacy of those interventions. 
 
 In the European Union, the neoclassical growth theory-inspired perception that increasing 
a region’s stock of infrastructure would, directly and indirectly, augment regional productivity 
and, in turn, spur growth, led to the channelling of significant resources to the expansion of what 
was already – or had recently become, following heavy investment in the preceding years – a 
reasonably mature transport infrastructure network. A failure, however, to consider how exactly 
the establishment of new infrastructure would complement or unlock a region’s assets of 
capabilities – or, relatedly, could be rendered ineffective by a lack thereof – resulted in the 
indiscriminate allocation of scarce financial resources to actions that, at best, failed to alleviate or 
rectify infrastructural deficiencies that inhibited productivity and stifled economic growth and, at 
worst, merely provided duplications of existing infrastructure or services. In both Peru and 
Greece, special economic zones and science and technology parks, respectively, were merely 
imposed, without complementary or supportive policy actions, on regions by policy-makers that 
did not, or were unable to, ingrate them into their respective economic fabrics. This failure 
undermined the purported theoretical potential of these interventions to serve as growth poles 
that leverage external investment and, in the case the science and technology parks the 
externalities associated with co-location, to provide a boost to and catalyse the growth of the 
broader geographic regions in which they are situated. The Filipino education systems displayed 
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a similar, equally problematic ‘unidimensionality’ as well. The country’s robust medical training 
system that should, according to endogenous theories of growth, churn out the skilled human 
capital that drives economic growth, was rendered ineffective by an absence of efforts to match 
and integrate a focus on the supply of skills and education with and into initiatives to create 
sufficiently high-quality employment opportunities through which educated persons could 
exploit their skills and contribute to economic growth. The innovation-oriented, endogenous 
growth theory-guided efforts of the European Union to foster economic dynamism via 
expenditure in the generation of knowledge that was anticipated to spur the technological process 
that underpins growth have been ineffective, again, in large part because of the omission of 
strategic interventions to ensure that the regions to which more and more R&D resources were 
geared to had or were able to develop the capacity and capabilities to mobilise and exploit them. 
 
 The strategies of gain outlined in preceding sections, were not, on the other hand, 
characterised by this ‘unidimensionality’. They were marked both by a distinct 
multidimensionality and by an integrative, balanced nature. In both China and Bangladesh, the 
infrastructure-oriented development projects were composed of several complementary 
components – that were also supplemented by institutionally-oriented reforms – that together 
promoted both the alleviation of specific bottlenecks and the upgrading of the overall 
infrastructure networks of their respective environments. Similarly, concerted efforts, in the form 
of both specific networking and linkage-promotion interventions and higher level regulatory 
reforms, were made an integral part of the Dominican Republic’s special economic zone 
programme as a means to embed the country’s zones in their respective regions. The inclusion of 
these efforts was motivated by the need to ensure, first, that local firms – and the regional 
economies they compose – could tap into and realize benefits from the zones to which they were 
proximate and, second, that the zones did not remain entirely disconnected form the 
environments in which they were established. In Vietnam, the strategic efforts to reform the 
country’s vocational and technical education system were, unlike many of those pursued 
elsewhere in the emerging world, devised in full awareness of the skills demands of local firms 
and the opportunities that existed in the labour market. The reforms were also envisioned as a 
vitally important part of, and were integrated into, the country’s broader market-oriented 
industrialization effort. Finally, Brazil’s APL cluster policies rely on an array of mutually-
 55 
reinforcing interventions and instruments that target and provide support to both the individual 
firms that compose the cluster as well as the interactions, relationships and linkages among 
actors in the cluster. Together, these actions foster the overall dynamism of the cluster to the 
benefit of the wider region in which it is situated and, via feedback mechanisms, the clustered 
firms themselves. 
 
 Unidimensional approaches to development, including the strategies of waste discussed, 
that operate along one development axis are informed by a very narrow understanding of the 
factors that condition and shape processes of economic growth and change. That is, they adhere, 
unfailingly, to the policy prescriptions that emerge from a single development theory (e.g. Barca 
et al., 2012: 137). As a consequence, such approaches tend not to account for the facts, first, as 
the evolution of growth and development theories would seem to confirm, that the economic 
performance and dynamism of any given region is likely governed and mediated by any number 
of contextually-specific factors, characteristics and attributes and that economic 
underperformance tends not to be attributable to one particular deficiency, but rather to several, 
inevitably interconnected ones (e.g. Dosi et al., 1994; Adelman, 1999; Dang and Pheng, 2015; 
Pike et al., 2017).  
 
Certain deficiencies may very well be, in some environments, more pronounced than 
others which may, in turn, lead development strategies to be oriented more squarely in one 
direction over another. Moreover, contextual conditions in certain environments may, for any 
number of reasons, be more receptive or amenable to certain types of policy interventions than 
others.  
 
Infrastructure investment can, for example, because of the diminishing returns to which it 
is subject and the expectation of limited returns beyond a certain threshold, be a suitable 
cornerstone for development strategies to be pursued in less-developed territories plagued by 
infrastructural deficiencies that stifle economic activity, trade, processes of territorial integration 
and/or individual mobility. Similarly, certain territories with burgeoning industrial or sectoral 
specialisations, and the competitive advantages and socioeconomic and institutional conditions 
to sustain it, may be in position where the inflow of foreign capital and firms could lead to the 
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rapid and sustainable expansion of that sector. Policy-makers in this type of territories should 
consider awarding inward investment-oriented actions a privileged position in the development 
strategies they devise and pursue.
31
 In a similar vein, the sorts of human capital or knowledge-
oriented initiatives prescribed by the endogenous growth theory may be more viable in more 
economically advanced environments where other, perhaps more fundamental, socioeconomic or 
structural deficiencies have been addressed and conditions are such that skills, knowledge and 
innovation can be internalised, mobilised and productively exploited. There is perhaps even 
scope for the development of economic growth strategies underpinned by cluster-based actions 
or initiatives in territories where dynamic economic actors are already located in close physical 
proximity and, consequently, the focus of said initiatives need not be on fostering physical co-
location but rather on the promotion of cooperation, collaboration and general interaction within 
the pre-existing agglomerations, and, by extension, on the establishment of linkages between the 
cluster and the territory that hosts it.    
 
All of this does not, however, imply that other, perhaps less pronounced shortcomings by 
which a region is plagued, or even its more general characteristics or attributes, can or should be 
overlooked and, more basically, that a wholly unidimensional approach will ever be appropriate. 
Development strategies need to consider the complexity of the factors that hinder development 
and involve a series of complementary structurally-, socioeconomically- and institutionally-
oriented actions and initiatives that would guarantee the best economic outcomes.  
 
                                                 
31
 It is critically important to note that the existence of ‘favourable’ socioeconomic conditions is not, in and of itself, 
sufficient justification for the pursuit of an inward-investment oriented approach designed to attract a particular 
sector or industry to a territory that has no pre-existing familiarity with, or competencies of relevance to it. Inward 
investment-oriented strategies will only succeed in first, attracting, and second, embedding (to the benefit of the host 
economy), the inward investment activities if there is a relevant foundation upon which they can draw. The reasons 
for this are two-fold. First, firms, increasingly guided by knowledge or competency acquisition intentions, are not 
attracted to environments from which they cannot benefit in one way or another. Second, a host economy will only 
benefit from the attraction of foreign firms and investment if it is capable of embedding it/them. Integration of this 
nature is not possible if local firms lack the skills, competencies and knowledge bases needed to engage, interact and 
develop relationships that will allow them to acquire knowledge from extra-local firms, and similarly, if workers 
lack the relevant skills and training needed to work for or provide services to the imported firms. Simply stated, the 
attraction of inward investment in a particular sector or industry to a region that is ex-ante not specifically suited to 
it will either be immediately ineffective or not sustainable. Trying to establish a new industry from scratch focusing 
only on the attraction of foreign firms is more likely than not to end up as a strategy of waste. 
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The reason for this is simple: local or regional economies are complex systems that 
feature and are characterised by any number of co-dependent relationships (Pike et al., 2017). 
The success of any given development action or intervention will therefore, almost inevitably, be 
a function of, and critically dependent on, several factors. Individual interventions along 
different development axes that together compose an integrated, multifaceted development 
strategy will, if designed appropriately with reference to local contextual conditions, work in a 
synergistic and mutually reinforcing manner to address all relevant deficiencies and produce 
outcomes that will exceed those unidimensional approaches rendered ineffective by the very 
factors and conditions they neglect. 
 
4.2. Understanding and responding to local conditions with precisely-targeted interventions 
 
The strategies of waste presented in Section 3.1 were plagued by a second weakness: the 
tailoring and targeting of the interventions by which the strategic approaches were composed 
often simply responded to theoretical tenets, without taking into consideration the conditions of 
the local economy. This was not the case in the strategies of gain.  
 
 The returns to the European Union’s efforts to expand its transportation infrastructure 
endowment were limited in large part because of their indiscriminate and imprecise nature. That 
is, resources that were earmarked for infrastructure development were spent not on projects that 
alleviated particular bottlenecks or addressed deficiencies in the continent’s transportation 
infrastructure network, but rather – and often because of aforementioned institutional failures – 
on larger scale, higher visibility projects in environments, regardless of their social and economic 
suitability. Infrastructure expenditure is subject to diminishing returns. Precise and efficiently 
targeted investments in environments that suffer from productivity-hampering infrastructure 
bottlenecks, deficiencies and shortages are therefore anticipated to yield considerably higher 
returns than those made in environments that are closer to or beyond the infrastructure frontier, 
as many of the European regions in which the infrastructure funds were spent, in fact, are. The 
continent’s R&D drive was, to the detriment of the development outcomes it was anticipated to 
give rise to, pursed in a similarly indiscriminate and imprecise way. European regions, because 
of the inevitably heterogeneity by which they are characterised, have, as highlighted in Section 
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3.1, different facilities for the transformation of R&D activities, and the knowledge they yield, 
into innovation and, in turn, economic growth. R&D expenditure was, however, prioritized 
universally: it was not geared towards or targeted at the European Union’s more developed, 
innovation prone regions, nor did consider or account in any way for the characteristics or 
attributes of the continent’s lagging regions that could conceivably compromise their capacity to 
realise any benefit from it. The returns to this strategic approach in the European Union’s 
innovation-averse, less developed territories were, therefore, meagre. In the Filipino case, the 
targeting failure was manifested in a complete neglect of the preeminent factor to which the 
limited returns to the country’s robust medical education and training system – and the well-
developed stock of skilled human capital it cultivated – were attributable. Policy-makers failed to 
target and, in turn, develop interventions to address the adverse demand-side conditions and 
issues (i.e. a dearth of higher-quality employment opportunities) behind the bottlenecks that 
hampered the capacity of economic actors to engage in productive activity and contribute to 
economic growth. The Peruvian special economic zone programme and the Greek science and 
technology park initiative suffered from a related targeting failure. In both cases, policy-makers 
pursued these interventions in environments that were less than able – due to a multitude of 
structural, socioeconomic and institutional deficiencies – to benefit from them. Because both the 
zones and the parks were conceived exactly as instruments to promote growth and development, 
the primary criterion considered in the targeting process was a region’s level of development, 
overlooking the very fact that lack adequate of development could undermine the success of 
activities within the zones or parks. The initiatives where therefore pursued exclusively in less-
developed regions that were at that stage far less favourability positioned to make the most of the 
investment. 
 
 Conversely, the strategies of gain examined were particularly impactful, in part, because 
of the way and extent to which they either targeted and mitigated the exact deficiencies that were 
hampering local and regional economic performance or, similarly, targeted and leveraged the 
advantages with which a region was endowed. The infrastructure development initiatives and 
actions undertaken in across Africa and in China and Bangladesh were geared exactly, in the 
former, to rectifying large-scale infrastructure shortages and, in the latter, to addressing and 
correcting bottlenecks and deficiencies in regional infrastructure networks. The environments in 
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which these efforts were pursued featured insufficiently developed infrastructure endowments 
meaning that any expenditure channelled towards their upgrading and expansion that would 
normally be subject to diminishing returns could yield returns in the form of economic growth 
and development. In the Dominican Republic, authorities recognised the advantages afforded to 
the country’s economy by its physical and institutional proximity to the United States and, in 
turn, devised what would prove to be an especially successful special economic zone 
programme. The programme explicitly targeted and contained measures to leverage and 
capitalise on this particular strength. Similarly, efforts to reform the Vietnamese vocational and 
technical education system sought to address a pronounced flaw that plagued it: prior to the 
execution of these initiatives, the country’s vocational and technical education system was all but 
completely detached from the labour market. Policy-makers engaged the private sector to correct 
for this and foster a greater matching between the education system and the skills requirements 
of firms to the benefit of newly educated individuals, those local firms and the economy more 
broadly. Brazil’s APL policies rely, to a greater extent than any of the other policies and 
strategies considered here, on formalised processes that facilitate the efficient and effective 
targeting of the interventions by which they are composed. Great care and thorough analysis are 
exercised and employed when selecting the clusters that will be subject to policy actions. The 
consequence of this is that APL policies are only operationalised in environments where there is 
a reasonable, objectively informed expectation that they will catalyse local economic growth and 
development. 
 
 Ensuring that policy interventions are both tailored to the geographies in which they are 
pursued and targeted appropriately towards either a specific challenge or weakness with which it 
is faced or a particular comparative or competitive advantage with which it is endowed, should 
therefore be seen as essential if the scarce resources that are allocated to efforts to promote 
economic growth and development are to be deployed in an efficient and effective manner. 
Efficient policy ‘tailoring’ and ‘targeting’ akin to that exemplified by the aforementioned 
strategies of gain is facilitated by robust diagnoses of local conditions and the performance of 
comprehensive situational analyses.  
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Different regions are characterised by distinctly different strengths and opportunities, 
and, conversely, challenges and vulnerabilities that are the product of and shaped by local 
context. Analyses of these conditions shed light not only on where viable opportunities for 
sustainable economic growth lie and what they might be, but also on the weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities that the strategy must mitigate. These diagnostic processes function, in that 
respect, as means to cultivate and collect the sorts of insights that constitute the foundation of 
economic development strategies that respond and are tailored to local conditions and the 
opportunities they offer (e.g. Cities Alliance, 2007).  
 
4.3. Understanding frontiers and diminishing returns  
 
 Sections on the literature on economic growth have for decades emphasised the 
importance of the position of a territory in the development scale as a factor determining the 
expected returns of any type of intervention (Rostow, 1960; Gerschenkron, 1962). How close a 
territory is to a specific frontier can determine what type of investment is required to maximise 
the returns of intervention. It has often been argued that being far from a frontier allows 
countries and regions to pursue basic investment and factor-endowment promotion strategies 
more freely than in those cases where a specific territory is closer to its respective frontier – as 
indicated by Acemoglu et al. (2006: 68) when referring to the technological frontier. The closer a 
country or region gets to a specific frontier, the greater the likelihood that any intervention on 
that particular development axis may be subject to diminishing returns. 
 
This seems to be confirmed by the cases reported in the empirical section. Countries and 
regions at earlier stages of development are able to address shortages in basic development 
factors without running the risk of suffering from diminishing returns. This has become evident 
with relation to infrastructure endowments. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, Bangladesh or 
Yunnan province in China, considerable investments in road infrastructure yielded considerable 
economic growth, whereas this was far less the case in the less developed regions of the 
European Union. High distance to the infrastructure frontier in sub-Saharan Africa and the two 
Asian examples explain this outcome. Deep infrastructural shortages in sub-Saharan Africa 
meant that any additional kilometre of road contributed to addressing a fundamental shortcoming 
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of the local economy and to facilitate further development. Less developed regions of Europe, by 
contrast, were not in a position that infrastructure shortages prevented them from conducting 
basic economic activities. They were and are closer to the infrastructure frontier than countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Hence, additional investments in road infrastructure could only bring about 
significant economic returns if specifically targeted to addressing well-identified development 
bottlenecks. However, the indiscriminate nature of most infrastructure investment in the 
periphery of the European Union – frequently geared towards increasing the number of airports, 
ports or kilometres of motorways and high-speed rail – implied that this condition was not 
fulfilled and that the economic returns of additional investment were much lower, when not 
outright negative.  
 
In particular, the diminishing returns of additional investment are affected by deficiencies 
in other development axes. Poorly targeted infrastructure investments in the European Union 
have been, to a considerable extent, a consequence of low government quality. Feeble 
governments and local decision-makers have often put short-term private and political gains 
before medium- and long-term sustainable socioeconomic outcomes (Crescenzi et al., 2016). 
Similarly, low quality institutions have dented the returns of R&D investment in the economic 
periphery of Europe (Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 2015) or in the Greek science and 
technology parks. These cases of strategies of waste were far closer to the technology frontier 
than the more successful Brazilian APL clusters or the special economic zones in the Dominican 
Republic. 
 
Hence, the farther a territory is from the frontier, the greater the likelihood that 
investments targeting basic deficiencies in infrastructure, human capital, and/or technological 
endowments succeed in delivering greater growth. Once the very basic needs for development to 
take off are fulfilled – that is, the closer a country or region comes to the infrastructure, human 
resources or technological frontier – diminishing returns are more likely to kick in, undermining 
the potential returns of any additional investment. Closer to these frontiers, a ‘switch’ is required 
(Acemoglu et al., 2006), implying a much more careful consideration of other factors influencing 
development and a more holistic and integrated development strategy.  
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4.4. Institutions, institutional reform and the pursuit of spatial development strategies 
 
 The final lesson to be drawn from the cases presented in Section 3 comes less from the 
underperformance of the strategies of waste and more from the successes of those of gain, and, 
more specifically, from a key factor to which their effectiveness is attributable: recognition of the 
‘institutional dimension’ and of the importance of mitigating and minimising the potential for 
institutionally-related failures. This recognition was manifested in one of two ways. 
 
 First, the infrastructure-oriented interventions mobilised in China and Bangladesh, the 
APL cluster policies employed by Brazilian authorities, and Vietnam’s efforts to reform its 
vocational and technical education system all featured explicit actions and measures to promote 
technical development, institutional upgrading and capacity building. The function of these 
actions in each of the approaches was to facilitate the design, operationalisation, and ongoing 
monitoring and maintenance of the strategies themselves. They were, however, also employed 
with a view to leave a longer-term, lasting impact on the capabilities, efficiency and overall 
functioning of the institutions and institutional actors they target. 
 
 Second, the special economic programme pursued in the Dominican Republic was 
characterised by an ongoing attentiveness to the broader institutional environment. Attention was 
paid to and efforts were made to adapt the regulatory and governance framework within which 
the programme was pursued to ensure that the zones themselves were and would remain, even in 
the face of macroeconomic changes and volatility, competitive and, more importantly, capable of 
fulfilling their mandate as catalysts for economic growth and development. Moreover, the 
development and implementation of the programme was matched by the establishment of a 
purpose-built institutional body, whose principle function is to regulate and oversee the country’s 
various zones. This awareness of the institutional environment in which the development 
approach existed served to ensure that not only that the interventions were unimpeded by 
regulatory or governance-related inefficiencies or barriers, but also that the institutional 
framework itself evolved into one that actually provided support and was conducive to the 
strategy and its overarching objectives.  
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 Consequently, the ‘institutional dimension’ is a fundamental requirement in the design 
and implementation of spatial development policies. More specifically, there is scope, if not an 
outright need, to both incorporate institutional reforms and capacity building initiatives into the 
development approaches themselves, and also employ a general awareness of – and where need 
be, to take action to address – broader institutional conditions and factors (Rodríguez-Pose and 
Garcilazo, 2015).  
 
 Capacity building and technical development-type interventions provide authorities, and 
institutional bodies more generally, with the capabilities, knowledge and resources (e.g. Whyte, 
2004; World Bank, 2005; OECD, 2006; World Bank Institute, 2009). It should never be taken 
for granted, especially in less-developed contexts, that authorities have the competencies needed 
to initiate and enact development strategies. Capacity constraints are not uncommon in the 
developing and emerging world (e.g. World Bank, 2005; OECD, 2006; Cardenas, 2010; Sanghvi 
et al., 2011; Haque et al., 2015). Integrating these sorts of actions and instruments into 
development approaches serves to ensure – or at the very least increase the probability – that the 
viability, sustainability and performance of spatial development policies are not compromised or 
damaged by capacity deficiencies that are navigable and manageable.  
 
 Capacity constraints can exist in any number of forms. What exactly authorities do to 
address and mitigate institutional deficiencies will greatly depend on the nature of the deficiency. 
The outcomes of any development intervention are, for example, shaped by the quality and 
capabilities of the authorities that are tasked with its design, operationalisation and oversight. 
Technical deficiencies in the form of a lack of skills, knowledge, experience or competencies 
will undermine the execution of any exercise, policy or strategy. Capacity building efforts in 
environments plagued by technical shortages should trend in the direction of training initiatives 
and programmes, the establishment of knowledge-sharing programmes and initiatives or the use 
of external resources and expertise (i.e. short-term consultants) to shore up these skills 
deficiencies. Relatedly, certain environments will suffer from other types of resources shortages. 
Policy-makers may, for example, not have access to, or the resources (human and/or financial) 
and infrastructure to collect or cultivate, the data and information needed to design and, 
eventually, monitor and modify suitable development interventions. When this is the case, efforts 
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should be pursued to first identify the resources shortages before channelling financial resources 
accordingly. The provision of these resources must, where necessary, be accompanied by 
initiatives (including those outlined above) to ensure that the authorities to whom they are 
provided have the competencies and skills needed to make the most of them.  There may also be 
scope here for intra- or interregional cooperation and resource sharing to address resource 
deficiencies and ‘stretch’ scarce resources.  Similarly, vertical and horizontal coordination 
failures represent another type of institutional failing that can derail development actions. 
Misaligned incentives or priorities, or even an insufficient awareness of what other parties are 
doing or responsible for will lead, at best, to overlaps that result in an inefficient deployment of 
resources or, worst, oversights and failures that will undermine the success and viability of 
otherwise sound interventions. Capacity building actions to address institutional obstacles of this 
nature will focus on the facilitation of communication and dialogue, the promotion of 
transparency and clarity and the clear delineation of responsibility. The identification and 
appointment of leaders or, relatedly, the establishment of specific bodies or institutions with 
narrowly and explicitly defined mandates represent means to achieve the latter end. This is by no 
means an exhaustive list of the institutional failings to which territories, and underdeveloped 
ones in particular, fall victim. It is provided merely to illustrate that simple solutions for all of the 
institutional deficiencies to which a particular region could conceivably be susceptible may be 
difficult to achieve. With this in mind, it becomes clear that the starting point for any effort to 
address institutional bottlenecks is their exact identification. By taking steps to identify and 
understand the nature of the institutional challenges they face, authorities can devise the most 
suitable reforms to address and overcome them. 
 
 Capacity building efforts should be matched by a general awareness of the efficiency, 
soundness and functioning of the broader institutional environment. With the ‘institutional turn’  
has come the increasingly widespread consensus that the effectiveness of any given development 
strategy will be mediated in one way or another by the institutional environment in which it is 
pursued. Rodríguez-Pose (2013: 1043), in fact, goes so far as to assert that “development 
strategies need to understand and be specifically tailored to the potential of place-bounded 
institutions in order to make the most of [other interventions]”. Ignorance of institutional factors 
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and conditions could therefore be, in and of itself, sufficient to derail what may otherwise be 
sound development strategies. 
 
 These two ‘lessons’, and the first one in particular, should ring especially true in 
devolved contexts. Subnational governments have, via the processes of devolution that have and 
continue to transpire across the emerging world, been afforded both the opportunity to 
implement development interventions that are reflective of local needs, preferences, priorities 
and contextual conditions and the more general capacity to tailor expenditure and decision-
making in these directions as well (e.g. Ascani et al., 2013; Rodríguez-Pose and Wilkie, 2017b).  
 
This can, as the Bolivian experience would seem to suggest, yield profoundly positive 
outcomes. Faguet’s (2004) examination, for example, of the post-devolution expenditure patterns 
of Bolivian municipalities revealed that authorities did capitalise on the resources and autonomy 
entrusted to them and channelled resources towards the provision of public goods and services in 
a manner that was consistent and coherent with the preferences of the citizens of, and the 
contextual conditions in, the jurisdictions for which they are responsible. Outcomes like these 
are, however, far from assured. Empirical analysis has, for example, indicated, first, that 
decentralisation – especially in the face of poor local government quality – may not only have 
little to no effect on economic performance but, in some circumstances, can actually hamper it 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011; Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose, 2013) and, second, that in less 
developed and emerging contexts, decentralisation can exacerbate regional inequalities 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). 
 
Whether devolution yields more-favourable outcomes, as in the Bolivian case, or less-
favourable ones depends critically on the institutional context within with it is pursued and, more 
specifically, on the capacities and capabilities of subnational authorities. That is, capacity 
constraints may, according to Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010: 622) “limit the potential of 
subnational governments to make the most of [decentralisation]”. The implementation of 
capacity building exercises, as advocated for above, could therefore go a considerable way 
towards mitigating what Parker and Serrano (2000: 26) term “one of the biggest challenges 
confronting local institutions as well as managers designing and implementing programs of 
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development” and, in turn, ensuring that subnational authorities can fulfil their responsibilities, 
whether they relate to the design and implementation of development policies or otherwise.  
 
5. Where should different types of strategies be implemented? Designing 
contextually suitable strategies.  
 
Territories require, as we have asserted in previous sections, development approaches 
that respond to the scale, scope and nature of the development challenges they face and the 
opportunities and potential with which they are endowed. It is therefore impossible to state 
where exactly different policy types should be pursued.  
 
General guidance as to how strategic approaches should be designed for different types of 
territories at different points on the development spectrum can, however, be provided. More 
specifically, the following section reflects on the nature of the development challenges with 
which different types of territories are confronted to construct a broad taxonomy of territorial 
development approaches. 
 
Our taxonomy is founded on the notions of what we term (1) complexity and (2) breadth 
of scope. Complexity is understood as a function of the number and diversity of the individual 
elements or interventions by which a broader strategic approach is composed. More tangibly, an 
integrated strategic approach that features a diversity of mutually reinforcing interventions and 
works across a range of development axes is deemed more complex than one that relies on a 
single type of instrument or action to affect change. Breadth of strategic scope refers, on the 
other hand, to the narrowness of the development outcomes or objectives by which a strategy is 
guided. The strategic scope, for example, of an approach that pursues a single, narrowly and 
precisely defined development outcome is narrower than that of one that aims to affect more 
broad-based, economy-wide change.  
 
We posit that the approaches employed by territories at different points on their 
respective growth trajectories should, irrespective of the development axis (or axes) to which 
they are oriented, differ in terms of their complexity and the breadth of their strategic scopes in 
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ways that reflect the nature of the most immediate development challenges with which they are 
faced. Our perspective is entirely consistent, in that respect, with the now well-established notion 
that, because developed and developing countries differ in terms of the challenges they face,and 
will trod different paths towards development,
32
 the development policies and strategies designed 
for and undertaken the in the ‘Global South’ can differ from those pursued in in the more 
economically developed ‘Global North’. We do, however, in some respects, push this notion a 
step further. That is, implicit in Sections 4 and 5 is the proposition that not only should the types 
of strategies and approaches relied upon in developing contexts not be lifted from or mirror those 
that have been pursued in developing areas. It would be dangerous to assume that a strategic 
approach that worked in one developing territory will be remotely suitable for a different, but 
similarly developed (or underdeveloped) one. Simply stated, there is scope (if not an outright 
need) for considerable policy heterogeneity even within the Global South.  
 
The underperformance of territories at the very bottom of the development spectrum is 
often attributable, at least in part, to fundamental structural deficiencies. These inadequacies are 
generally not difficult to identify nor are they insurmountable; policy-makers in Bangladesh and 
Central Yunnan, for example, found success channelling financial and other resources towards 
the construction of basic physical infrastructure – roads, bridges, etc. – the absence of which was 
both a readily apparent and pronounced impediment to economic dynamism (Section 3.2).  
 
The shoring up of deficiencies of this nature is, however, wholly prerequisite for the 
achievement of economic growth and development and, moreover, lays a foundation upon which 
subsequent development efforts can build. The scope of the territorial development policies 
pursued in these environments should therefore not extend beyond addressing these specific 
debilitating deficiencies. Their complexity needs to be kept to a minimum as well; not only are 
less integrated approaches often sufficient for managing deficiencies as precisely defined and 
comparatively basic as those by which the most economically underdeveloped of environments 
tend to be faced, they are less prone to derailment by the technical capacity constraints that are 
not uncommon in these contexts (Section 4.4).  
                                                 
32
 The recognition of the heterogeneity of the “problems” faced in the past by what are now developed countries and 
those with which developing countries are currently grappling was in fact, as Chant and McIlwaine (2009:26) 
observe, the impetus for the establishment of ‘Development Theory’. 
 68 
 
Simply stated, development approaches designed for the most economically 
disadvantaged of territories would benefit from being characterised by a minimal degree of 
complexity and feature relatively narrow strategic scopes. We term this first type of strategic 
approach ‘simple and narrowly-focused’ (Figure 5). 
 
As we move up the development spectrum to underdeveloped territories where 
pronounced challenges remain but the debilitating factors of the sort highlighted above are less 
ubiquitous, the strategic scope of territorial development approaches can begin to widen. The 
development challenges by which territories like these are faced relate less to rectifying and 
overcoming specific barriers that are preventing economic growth and more to cultivating a 
broader socioeconomic context that underpins, and is itself supportive of, all manner of 
economic activity with an ultimate view to spark and actively promote dynamism and 
development. In Vietnam, for example, authorities prioritised general upskilling and human 
capital development to initiate the transformation of the country’s labour force into one that 
could participate in and contribute to the drive towards industrialisation and to its more general 
efforts to place the economy on a sustainable and rising growth trajectory (Section 3.2).  
 




It follows that the narrow focus that should be characteristic of the development 
approaches undertaken by the most economically disadvantaged territories need to be replaced 
here by a concern for affecting more broad-based change. Once again, however, these strategies 
need not be overly complex. They will in all likelihood, because of the more broadly-defined 
development outcomes they pursue, rely on a comparatively greater number and diversity of 
individual interventions. That said, technical capacity constraints that compromise policy 
efficiency and effectiveness remain a concern for policy-makers in these environments (Section 
4.4) and, moreover, the change these approaches seek to affect – i.e. more general contextual 
upgrading and conditioning – is still sufficiently fundamental that the degree of integration and 
multidimensionality by which they are characterised need not be massive. 
 
  Development approaches that are simple in nature and but broad in strategic scope are 
most suitable for less economically developed territories. ‘Simple and broadly focused’ strategic 
approaches are the second type included in the taxonomy (Figure 5). 
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 A different tact will need to be taken in emerging territories. The most pressing 
development challenge that they tend to face relates not to addressing debilitating structural 
deficiencies or weaknesses in underlying socioeconomic fabrics, but rather to the avoidance of 
economic stagnation and of something akin to a ‘middle income trap’ (e.g. Nallari et al., 2011; 
Kharas and Kohli, 2011; Eichengreen et al., 2013). That is, these territories have often 
successfully navigated a range of more fundamental development challenges – including those 
addressed above – and, in turn, likely benefitted from a sustained period of economic expansion. 
The pace of that growth will, however, be slowing or, in more extreme cases, have stagnated.  
 
Figure 6. The ‘complexity-economic development’ nexus  
 
Authors' elaboration 
The options for escaping this so-called ‘trap’ are few. Meaningful increases in 
productivity (e.g. Kharas and Kohl, 2011) are perhaps the best way to break out of the trap. This 
involves repositioning the economy as a whole towards higher-value added, more knowledge-
intensive activities and undertaking a range of institutional reforms to make the territory 
amenable, if not wholly conducive, to innovation and more technologically sophisticated activity 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 2015).  
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Suffice to say, strategic approaches undertaken in these emerging environments should, 
like those pursued in the aforementioned less developed territories, be broad in strategic scope; 
they will, after all, be geared towards economy-wide reformation. The nature of the change these 
approaches must aim to affect, however, demands that they be far more complex, integrated and 
multidimensional than those designed for environments less developed than they. That is, 
repositioning an economy and, more specifically, upgrading its innovative potential and capacity 
to engage in knowledge-intensive activities entails working across structural, socioeconomic and 
institutional dimensions which, in turn, implies that strategic approaches need to be composed of 
a diversity of mutually reinforcing interventions and actions that span these, and other, 
development axes.   
 
Emerging territories therefore have little choice but to pursue more complex, integrated 
development approaches that operate across several development dimensions and are oriented 
towards affecting broad-based, economy-wide change; such approaches are understood in our 
taxonomy as ‘complex and broadly focused’ (Figure 5). 
 
In more developed territories, the focus shifts away from development challenges per se 
towards what can be considered development opportunities. That is, more economically 
advanced territories will likely – whether it is due to resource endowments or constraints, the 
economic activities they engage or specialise in, or any other number of territorially-unique 
factors – have specific avenues available to them that they may pursue to promote further growth 
and development. Moreover, the returns to broad-based reform will be limited in these more 
dynamic territories where growth-impairing structural, socioeconomic or institutional 
deficiencies are fewer and further between and, in turn, the scope for generalist, ‘corrective’ 
interventions is far less necessary.  
 
The job of policy-makers in these environments is therefore to, first, identify where these 
latent opportunities lie and, in turn, develop focused policies geared narrowly and explicitly 
towards their exploitation. More complex, multidimensional approaches should be relied upon to 
do so. Policy-makers in these environments are often unencumbered by resource and/or technical 
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capacity constraints leaving little reason not to pursue the integrated, multi-axes approaches that, 
as previous sections have suggested (Section 4.1), are anticipated to yield the greatest returns. 
 
Figure 7. The ‘breadth of strategic scope-economic development’ nexus 
 
Authors' elaboration 
The fourth and final type of approaches included in our taxonomy are those that are 
ideally suited to the most economically developed of territories. These integrated approaches 
will pull a range of policy levers to achieve precisely and narrowly defined objectives and are 




The development policy landscape has, in recent years, been dominated by four types of 
interventions each of which finds its conceptual or theoretical underpinning in a different 
theoretical perspective or paradigm (Section 2). 
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1. Infrastructure-oriented development approaches emerged from a neoclassical growth 
theory that understood economic growth as a function of the relative availability of 
different factors of production – capital, technology and labour – the productivity of 
which could be positively augmented by investment in and the expansion of regional 
infrastructure endowments; 
  
2. Policies and interventions geared towards the establishment of ‘growth poles’ via the 
attraction and concentration of external investment and non-local firms grew out of 
‘growth pole’ theories that posit that the economic fortunes of entire regions are linked to 
the success and dynamism of single points or nodes within them;  
 
3. The endogenous growth theory, and, more specifically, an awareness of the first-order 
importance of knowledge and technological progress placed both regional innovative 
capacities and regional human capital and skills endowments squarely in the crosshairs of 
policy-makers and gave rise to a host of innovation and skills oriented-interventions and 
policies; and 
 
4. Strategic efforts to promote the physical co-location of firms and the establishment of 
clusters of economic activity were inspired by theories proposed by both the urban 
economics and new economic geography schools as well as by cluster and industrial 
districts theories that suggest that the operation of economic actors in close physical 
proximity gives rise to productivity enhancing externalities from which those actors, and 
by extension the cluster and the region that hosts it, benefit. 
 
Policy-makers in developed, emerging and developing contexts alike have turned to one 
or more of these strategic interventions to increase the economic dynamism of the territories for 
which they are responsible (Section 3). The performance history of each of the four broad 
policies types includes both instances of success (Section 3.2) and failure (Section 3.1). 
 
Moreover, one instance of success or failure does not imply that a particular approach can 
be, reproduced everywhere or universally condemned; what might amount to a strategy of waste 
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in one territory could perhaps be usefully employed in another, or, conversely, there is no 
assurance that the success of a strategy of gain in a certain territory at a certain point in time 
could be duplicated elsewhere. Simply stated, no one type of intervention on its own is more 
likely than the next to amount to a failure –  strategy of waste – or a success –  strategy of gain. 
The success or failure of a particular intervention is seemingly a function not necessarily of what 
theoretical strand it is based on or of what it focuses on to impel growth but rather of where, how 
and by whom it is pursued. This, of course, begs the question: what makes for a successful 
development policy or intervention? 
 
 A review of a handful of both strategies of gain and strategies of waste revealed four key 
differences between them from which policy implications were inferred: 
 
1. Territorial development policies must operate across and address more than one 
development axis. Because of the way and extent to which processes of economic growth 
are governed and mediated by any number of contextually-specific specific factors, 
characteristics and attributes, strategic approaches to economic development are more 
likely to be successful if they are ‘multidimensional’ in nature. Hence, concerted efforts 
are needed to integrate and balance interventions that target all relevant development 
axes; 
  
2. Territorial development should rely on robust diagnoses of local economic conditions to 
facilitate, first, the tailoring of the interventions by which they are composed to the 
specificities of the territory in which they are to be pursued. Second, interventions need to 
be targeted towards specific weaknesses, deficiencies or bottlenecks that represent 
genuine and pronounced impediments to regional economic growth and dynamism, or to 
foster any advantages or opportunities with which a region might be endowed;  
 
3. The stage in the development spectrum where a territory finds itself matters for the type 
of approach that needs to be adopted. The greater the endowment shortages and the 
farther away from infrastructure, human capital and technology frontiers, the greater the 
chance that basic investments in human capital, technology and, above all, infrastructure 
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may lead to significant economic growth. Once basic endowments in one or more of 
these areas are covered, the risk of diminishing returns to additional investment increases; 
and 
 
4. Institutionally-oriented interventions and actions – capacity building efforts, technical 
development exercises, institutional reforms and the like – must be integrated directly 
into territorial development strategies.  
 
The potential of theory-led development approaches – whether infrastructure-, inward 
investment-, innovation-, skills- and cluster-based – to spatial and territorial development 
strategies is considerable if the four principles outlined above are taken into consideration. 
Development approaches can serve as catalysts for regional economic growth and 
socioeconomic development in radically different contexts. Yet the line separating development 
interventions becoming strategies of gain from strategies of waste is thin. Policies and 
programmes that are both composed of and balance numerous mutually-reinforcing interventions 
and tailored and adapted to local conditions and realities and are integrated into broader strategic 
efforts and plans are likely to have a greater economic impact. Efficiently and effectively gearing 
intervention towards the challenges facing any given place and to the opportunities with which it 
is endowed, while taking into account the institutional context in which it is operationalised – 
and, should the need exist, being able to upgrade and rectify deficiencies from which it suffers – 
can deliver better results than simply basing intervention on one particular, often ‘fashionable’, 
theoretical strand.  Processes of economic growth are not governed by one single influence. They 
are shaped and mediated, at any one time, by any number of socioeconomic, structural and 
institutional factors – all of which must be taken into account and addressed by efforts that aim 
to stimulate such processes. Moreover, these processes of economic growth transpire in different 
ways across heterogeneous contexts – that is, they react differently to different realities – simply 
because contextual conditions impose different challenges and offer different opportunities and 
avenues for growth. The key to success in the design and operationalisation of policy 
interventions is thus ensuring that these approaches are not detached from this reality. Adherence 
to the aforementioned four principles will, in most cases, increase the probability that 
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interventions do not fall victim to this pitfall and that the promise and potential of economic 
development interventions is fulfilled. 
 
The provision of policy guidance more specific than this is challenging. Notably, we 
must refrain from prescribing infrastructure-based, inward investment-based, innovation- or 
human capital-oriented or cluster-based approaches to heterogeneous territories in a categorical 
or definitive manner. It would be unwise, for example, to assert that any one of these approaches 
is more or less suitable for a more or less economically developed territory. What we can do, 
however, is reflect on the nature of the development challenges by which different types of 
territories at different points on the development spectrum are faced and devise more general 
guidelines centring on the notions of policy ‘complexity’ and ‘breadth of strategic scope’.  
 
We posit that (i) the most economically disadvantaged territories should embrace 
strategic approaches that are simple in nature and narrow in scope; (ii) that less economically 
developed territories should opt for simple, but more broadly-oriented strategies; (iii) that 
emerging territories should rely on broad-based approaches that are, on the other hand, more 
complex and integrated in nature; and (iv) that the more developed areas should turn to strategies 
that are, again, complex but are narrowly and precisely targeted to affect change. Strategic 
approaches to development cannot be designed on the basis of this taxonomy alone. That said, it 
does provide policy-makers with a framework and a set of criteria for thinking about what a 
suitable approach for the promotion of economic development in the territories for which they 





Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P. and Zilibotti, F. (2006), Distance to frontier, selection, and economic 
growth. Journal of the European Economic Association, 4: 37–74. 
Adelman, I. (1999). Fallacies in Development Theory and their Implications for Policy 
(Department of Agriculture and Resource Economics and Policy Working Papers No. 887). 
Berkeley. 
African Development Bank. (2011). Botswana: Trans-Kgalagadi Road Project – Project 
Performance Evaluation Report. Abidjan: African Development Bank Group.  
Agénor, P., & Moreno-Dodson, B. (2006). Public Infrastructure and Growth: New Channels and 
Policy Implications (Policy Research Working Papers No. 4064). Policy Research Working 
Papers. 
Aghion, P., & Howitt, P. (1998). Endogenous Growth Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Aghion, P., & Howitt, P. (1992). A model of growth through creative destruction. Econometrica, 
60(2), 323–351. http://doi.org/10.2307/2951599 
Albalate, D., Bel, G., & Fageda, X. (2015). When supply travels far beyond demand: Causes of 
oversupply in Spain’s transport infrastructure. Transport Policy, 41, 80–89. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2015.03.004 
Alburo, F. A., & Abella, D. I. (2002). Skilled Labour Migration from Developing Countries: 
Study on the Philippines. Geneva. 
Aristovnik, A. (2012). The relative efficiency of education and R&D expenditures in the new EU 
member states. Journal of Business Economics and Management, 13(5), 832–848. 
http://doi.org/10.3846/16111699.2011.620167 
Ascani, A., Crescenzi, R., & Iammarino, S. (2012). Regional Economic Development: A Review 
(SEARCH Working Papers No. WP1/03). 
Asian Development Bank. (2016). People’s Republic of China: Central Yunnan Roads 
Development Project. Mandaluyong City: Asian Development Bank. 
Asian Development Bank. (2013). Viet Nam: Vocational and Technical Education Project. 
Mandaluyong City: Asian Development Bank. 
Barca, F., Mccann, P., & Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2012). The case for regional development 
intervention: Place-based versus place-neutral approaches. Journal of Regional Science, 
52(1), 134–152. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9787.2011.00756.x 
 78 
Barro, R., & Sala-i-Martin, X. (2005). Growth Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Bilbao-Osorio, B., & Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2004). From R&D to Innovation and Economic 
Growth in the EU. Growth and Change, 35(4), 434–455. 
Bosede, A., Abalaba, B., & Afolabi, D. (2013). Transport Infrastructure Improvement and 
Economic Growth in Nigeria. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 
Invention, 2(8), 26–31. 
Calderón, C., & Serven, L. (2008). Infrastructure and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Policy Research Working Paper No. 4712). Washington D.C. 
Calderón, C., & Servén, L. (2004). The Effects of Infrastructure Development on Growth and 
Income Distribution (Policy Research Working Papers No. 3400). Policy Research Working 
Papers. 
Canning, D., & Pedroni, P. (2004). The effect of infrastructure on long run economic growth. 
Cambridge, MA. 
Cappelen, A., Castellacci, F., Fagerberg, J., & Verspagen, B. (2003). The Impact of Regional 
Support on Growth and Convergence in the European Union. Journal of Commen Market 
Studies, 41(4), 621–644. http://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00438 
Cárdenas, M. (2010). State Capacity in Latin America. Washington D.C. Retrieved from 
http://economics.ucr.edu/seminars_colloquia/2010/applied_economics/Cardenas paper for 
econ sem 5 7 10.pdf 
Chant, S., & McIlwaine, C. (2009). Geographies of Development in the 21st Century: An 
Introduction to the Global South. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
Charlot, S., Crescenzi, R., & Musolesi, A. (2012). An “Extended” Knowledge Production 
Function Approach To the Genesis of Innovation in the European Regions (Working Paper 
GAEL No. 2012–6). Grenoble. 
Chingoiro, S., & Mbulawa, S. (2016). Economic Growth and Infrastructure Expenditure in 
Kenya: A Granger-Causality Approach. International Journal of Social Science Studies, 
4(9), 1–8. http://doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v4i9.1749 
Cities Alliance. (2007). Organising the effort. In Understanding Your Local Economy - A 
Resource Guide for Cities (pp. 5–16). Washington D.C.: The Cities Alliance. 
Crescenzi, R. (2005). Innovation and regional growth in the enlarged Europe: The role of local 
innovative capabilities, peripherality, and education. Growth and Change, 36(4), 471–507. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2257.2005.00291.x 
 79 
Crescenzi, R., Di Cataldo, M., & Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2016). Government Quality and the 
Economic Returns of Transport Infrastructure Investment in European Regions. Journal of 
Regional Science, 56(4), 555–582. http://doi.org/10.1111/jors.12264 
Crescenzi, R., & Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2012). Infrastructure and regional growth in the european 
union. Papers in Regional Science, 91(3), 487–513. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1435-
5957.2012.00439.x 
Dang, L., & Pheng, M. (2015). Theories of Economic Development. In Infrastructure 
Investments in Developing Economies (pp. 11–27). Singapore: Springer Science+Business 
Media. http://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-248-7 
De la Fuente, A. (2010). Infrastructures and Productivity (Barcelona Economics Working Paper 
Series No. 475). Barcelona.  
Di Gropello, E. (2006). Meeting the Challenges of Secondary Education in Latin America and 
East Asia. Washington D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Developmenet/The World Bank Group. http://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-6645-5 
Dillinger, W. (2007). Poverty and Regional Development in Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(World Bank Working Papers No. 118). Washington D.C. Retrieved from 
http://www.worldbank.icebox.ingenta.com/content/wb/2430 
Dimaya, R. M., McEwen, M. K., Curry, L. A., & Bradley, Elizabeth, H. (2012). Managing health 
worker migration: a qualitative study of the Philippine response to nurse brain drain. Human 
Resources for Health, 10(47), 1–8. 
Dosi, G., Freeman, C., & Fabiani, S. (1994). The process of economic developement : 
Intoducting some stylized facts and theories of technologies, firms and institutions. 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 3(1), 1–45. 
Duranton, G., & Puga, D. (2004). Micro-foundations of urban agglomeration economies. In J. V. 
Henderson & J.-F. Thisse (Eds.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics (Vol. 4, pp. 
2063–2117). Amsterdam: Elsevier. http://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0080(04)80005-1 
Eichengreen, B., Park, D., & Shin, K. (2013). Growth Slowdown Redux: New Evidence on the 
Middle-Income Trap (NBER Working Papers No. 18673). Cambridge, MA. 
ELLA. (2013). From Supply-To Demand-Led: Labour Training in Latin America. Lima. 
European Commission. (2014). Draft thematic guidance fiche for desk officers - Transport. 
Brussels. 
Ezcurra, R., & Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2013). Political Decentralization, Economic Growth and 
Regional Disparities in the OECD. Regional Studies, 47(3), 388–401. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2012.731046 
 80 
Faguet, J.-P. (2004). Does decentralization increase government responsiveness to local needs? 
Journal of Public Economics, 88(3–4), 867–893. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-
2727(02)00185-8 
Farole, T., & Akinci, G. (2011). Special Economic Zones - Progress, Emerging Challenges and 
Future Directions. Washington D.C.: World Bank. Retrieved from 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/978-0-8213-8763-4 
FIAS. (2008). Special Economic Zones - Performance, Lessons Learned, and Implications for 
Zone Development. Washington D.C.: The World Bank Group. http://doi.org/10.1596/978-
0-8213-8763-4 
Finch, S. (2013). Philippines brain drain: fact or fiction. Canadian Medical Assocation Journal, 
185(12), E557–E558. 
Foster, V., & Briceno-Garmendia, C. (2010). Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation. 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank Group. http://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-8041-3 
Frick, S., Rodríguez-Pose, A. and Wong, M. (2018) Towards economically dynamic Special 
Economic Zones in emerging countries. Economic Geography, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00130095.2018.1467732. . 
Fujita, M., Krugman, P., & Venables, A. J. (2000). The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions and 
International Trade. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Fujita, M., & Thisse, J.-F. (2002). Economics of Agglomeration. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Gaisford, J., Kerr, W., Phillips, P., & Ryan, C. (2010). Canadian Agricultural Biotechnology 
Clusters: Innovation and Performance. In Z. Chen & M. Duhamel (Eds.), Industrial 
Organization in Canada: Empirical Evidence and Policy Challenges (pp. 284–337). 
Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Garone, L. F., Maffioli, A., de Negri, J. A., Rodriguez, C. M., & Vazquez-Bare, G. (2015). 
Cluster development policy, SME’s performance, and spillovers: evidence from Brazil. 
Small Business Economics, 44, 925–948. 
Gerschenkron, A. (1962) Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, Ma.: 
Harvard University Press. 
Glaeser, E. L. (2010). Agglomeration Economies. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. 
http://doi.org/10.3109/10826084.2014.916521 
Grossman, G., & Helpman, E. (1994). Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of Growth. The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(1), 23–44. 
 81 
Gutman, J., Sy, A., & Chattopadhyay, S. (2015). Financing African Infrastructure: Can the 
World Deliver? Washington D.C.: Brookings Foundation. 
Haque, T. A., Knight, D., & Jayasuriya, D. (2015). Capacity Constraints and Public Financial 
Management in Small Pacific Island Countries. Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, 2(3), 1–
14. http://doi.org/10.1002/app5.79 
Hartzenberg, T. (2011). Regional Integration in Africa (No. ERSD-2011-14). Staff Working 
Paper. 
Hirschman, A. (1958). The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
ICA. (2014). Infrastructure Financing Trends in Africa - 2013. Tunis: The Infrastructure 
Consortium for Africa. 
Iammarino, S., Rodríguez-Pose, A. and Storper, M. (2018) Regional inequality in Europe: 
evidence, theory and policy implications. Journal of Economic Geography,  
https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lby021. 
Kharas, H., & Kohli, H. (2011). What Is the Middle Income Trap , Why do Countries Fall into It, 
and How Can It Be Avoided ? Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies, 3(3), 281–
289.  
Kodongo, O., & Ojah, K. (2016). Does infrastructure really explain economic growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa? Review of Development Finance, 6, 105–125. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2016.12.001 
Krugman, P. (1991). Geography and Trade. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Kumo, W. L. (2012). Infrastructure Investment and Economic Growth in South Africa : A 
Granger Causality Analysis (Working Paper Series No. 160). African Development Bank 
Group. Tunis. 
Lerner, J. (2009). Boulevard of broken dreams: Why public efforts to boost entrepreneurship and 
venture capital have failed—and what to do about it. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Lorenzo, F. M. E., Galvez-Tan, J., Icamina, K., & Javier, L. (2007). Nurse Migration from a 
Source Country Perspective: Philippine Country Case Study. Health Research and 
Educational Trust, 42(3), 1406–1418. 
Lucas, R. E. (1988). On the Mechanics of Economic Development. Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 22, 3–42. http://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(88)90168-7 
Maclaurin, W. R. (1953). The Sequence from Invention to Innovation and its Relation to 
Economic Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 67(1), 97–111. 
 82 
Martin, R., & Sunley, P. (2003). Deconstructing clusters: chaotic concept or policy panacea? 
Journal of Economic Geography, 3, 5–35. http://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/3.1.5 
Mbekeani, K. K. (2010). Infrastructure, Trade Expansion and Regional Integration: Global 
Experience and Lessons for Africa. Journal of African Economies, 19(AERC Supplement 
1), i88–i113. http://doi.org/10.1093/jae/ejp021 
Nallari, R., Yusuf, S., Griffith, B., & Bhattacharya, R. (2011). Frontiers in Development Policy - 
A Primer on Emerging Issues. Washington D.C.: The World Bank Group. 
OECD. (2012). OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2012. Paris: OECD 
Publishing. 
OECD. (2015). OECD Education Policy Outlook 2015 - Making Reforms Happen. Paris: OECD 
Publishing. 
OECD. (2006). The Challenge of Capacity Development - Working Towards Good Practice. 
Paris: OECD Publishing. http://doi.org/10.2217/fvl.10.63.Towards 
Otoo, S., Agapitova, N., & Behrens, J. (2009). The Capacity Development Results Framework - 
A strategic and results-oriented approach to learning for capacity development. 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank Group. 
Oughton, C., Landabaso, M., & Morgan, K. (2002). The Regional Innovation Paradox : 
Innovation Policy and Industrial Policy. Journal of Technology Transfer, 27, 97–110. 
Parker, A., & Serrano, R. (2000). Promoting Good Governance through Social Funds and 
Decentralization (Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No. 22). Washington D.C. 
Parr, J. (1999). Growth-pole Strategies in Regional Economic Planning: A Retrospective View. 
Part 1. Origins and Advocacy. Urban Studies, 36(7), 1195–1215. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/0042098993187 
Perroux, F. (1950). Economic space: theory and application. Quarterly Journal Of Economics, 
64, 89–104. 
Perroux, F. (1955). Note sur la notion de pole de croissance. Economie Appliquee, 8, 307–320. 
Phan, D., & Coxhead, I. (2015). Education in Southeast Asia: Investments, achievements, and 
returns. In Handbook of Southeast Asian Economics. Abingdon: Routledge. Retrieved from 
http://www.aae.wisc.edu/hoseae/d11v1.pdf 
Pike, A., Rodríguez-Pose, A., & Tomaney, J. (2017). Local and Regional Development. New 
York/London: Routledge. 
Porter, M. E. (1990) The competitive advantage of nations. New York: Free Press. 
 83 
 
Roberts, K. M. (1995). Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism in Latin America: the 
Peruvian case. World Politics, 48(1): 82-116. 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. (1999). Innovation prone and innovation averse societies: economic 
performance in Europe. Growth and Change, 30, 75–105. http://doi.org/10.1111/0017-
4815.00105 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2013). Do Institutions Matter for Regional Development? Regional Studies, 
47, 1034–1047. http://doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2012.748978 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2018). The revenge of the places that don’t matter (and what to do about it). 
Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 11, 189–209.  
Rodríguez-Pose, A.and Di Cataldo, M. (2015) Quality of government and innovative 
performance in the regions of Europe. Journal of Economic Geography, 15(4): 673-706. 
Rodríguez-Pose, A., & Fratesi, U. (2004). Between Development and Social Policies: The 
Impact of European Structural Funds in Objective 1 Regions. Regional Studies, 38(1), 97–
113. 
Rodríguez-Pose, A., & Ezcurra, R. (2010). Does decentralization matter for regional disparities? 
A cross-country analysis. Journal of Economic Geography, 10(5), 619–644. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbp049 
Rodríguez-Pose, A., & Ezcurra, R. (2011). Is fiscal decentralization harmful for economic 
growth? Evidence from the OECD countries. Journal of Economic Geography, 11(4), 619–
643. http://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbq025 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. and Garcilazo, E. (2015) Quality of government and the returns of 
investment: Examining the impact of cohesion expenditure in European regions. Regional 
Studies 49(8): 1274-1290. 
Rodriguez-Pose, A., & Hardy, D. (2014). Technology and Industrial Parks in Emerging 
Countries - Panacea or Pipedream. Cham: Springer International Publishing.Rodríguez-
Pose, A., & Wilkie, C. (2017a). Innovation and competitiveness in the periphery of Europe. 
In R. Huggins (Ed.), Handbook of Regions and Competiveness, 351-380. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
Rodríguez-pose, A., & Wilkie, C. (2017b). Revamping Local and Regional Development 
Through Place-Based Strategies. Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and 
Research, 19(1), 151–170. 
Romer, P. (1986). Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth. Journal of Political Economy, 
94(5), 1002–37. http://doi.org/10.1086/261420 
 84 
Romer, P. M. (1990). Endogenous Technological Change. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), 
S71–S102. http://doi.org/10.1086/261725 
Romp, W., & Haan, J. De. (2007). Public capital and economic growth: A critical survey. 
Perspektiven Der Wirtschaftspolitik, 8(SPEC. ISSUE), 6–52. http://doi.org/10.1111/1468-
2516.00242 
Rostow, W. W. (1960). The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sanghvi, S., Simons, R., & Uchoa, R. (2011). Four lessons for transforming african agriculture. 
Retrieved from http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-insights/four-
lessons-for-transforming-african-agriculture 
Serven, L. (2010). Infrastructure and Growth. Retrieved from 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentM
DK:22629797~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:469382,00.html 
Solow, R.M. (1956) A contribution to the theory of economic growth. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 70: 65-94. 
Sterlacchini, A. (2008). R&D, higher education and regional growth: Uneven linkages among 
European regions. Research Policy, 37, 1096–1107. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2008.04.009 
Storper, M. (2018). Separate Worlds ? Explaining the current wave of regional economic 
polarization, 18, 247–270.  
Storper, M., & Venables, A. J. (2004). Buzz: Face-to-face contact and the urban economy. 
Journal of Economic Geography, 4, 351–370. http://doi.org/10.1093/jnlecg/lbh027 
Straub, S. (2008). Infrastructure and Growth in Developing Countries: Recent Advances and 
Research Challenges (Policy Research Working Papers No. 4460). Policy Research 
Working Papers. Washington D.C. Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1080475 
Swan, T.W. (1956) Economic growth and capital accumulation. Economic Record, November: 
334-361. 
Tödtling, F., & Trippl, M. (2005). One size fits all? Towards a differentiated regional innovation 
policy approach. Research Policy, 34, 1203–1219. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2005.01.018 
Tsamis, A. (2009). Science and Technology Parks in the less favoured regions of Europe: An 
evaluation of their performance and the parameters of success. London School of 
Economics and Political Science. 
 85 
Whyte, A. (2004). Landscape Analysis of Donor Trends in International Development (Human 
and Institutional Capacity Building: A Rockerfeller Foundation Series No. 2). New York. 
World Bank. (2009). World Development Report 2009 – Reshaping Economic Geography. 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank.  
World Bank. (2010). Innovation Policy - A Guide for Developing Countries. Washington D.C.: 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank. 
World Bank. (2016a). Republic of Peru: Review of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Washington 
D.C.: The World Bank Group. 
World Bank. (2016b). Special Economic Zones, Global Value Chains, and the Degree of 
Domestic Linkages in the Dominican Republic. Washington D.C.: The World Bank Group. 
World Bank. (2016c). Bangladesh Rural Transport Improvement Project - Phase 1. Washington 
D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. 
World Bank. (2005). Capacity Building in Africa - An OED Evaluation of World Bank Support. 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank Group. 
 
 
 
